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More Horse-Hair for the Sword of 
Damocles?  The Rhode Island 
Probation System and Comparisons to 
Federal Law 
Timothy Baldwin and Olin Thompson*† 
Then he chanced to raise his eyes toward the ceiling.  
What was it that was dangling above him, with its point 
almost touching his head?  It was a sharp sword, and it 
was hung by only a single horse-hair. What if the hair 
should break?  There was danger every moment that it 
would do so.1 
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. St. Hill2 has the trappings of a 
standard appeal from federal district court.  The facts and travel 
are pedestrian: the defendant pleaded guilty to distributing drugs 
 
* Timothy Baldwin, J.D., Northwestern University, and Olin Thompson, 
Assistant Federal Defender, District of Rhode Island.  The authors would like 
to thank the Honorable John J. McConnell, Jr., the Honorable Patricia A. 
Sullivan, Lara Montecalvo, Angela Yingling, Kara Maguire, Amy Moses and 
Professor Andrew Horwitz for their comments on drafts of this Article. 
† The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors. 
 1.  State v. Parson, 844 A.2d 178, 180 n.2 (R.I. 2004) (quoting The 
Sword of Damocles, in FAVORITE TALES OF LONG AGO 97, 98–99 (Aladdin 
Books 1955) (retold by James Baldwin)) (probation revocation decision). 
 2.  768 F.3d 33, 34 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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in hopes of less jail-time but appealed after receiving a stiffer 
sentence than expected.  The defendant’s displeasure stemmed 
from the government’s reliance on “relevant conduct” evidence to 
increase the guidelines range for the sentence.3  The defendant 
admitted to selling a small number of oxycodone pills, but at 
sentencing, the government introduced evidence of other drug 
sales that it did not charge by indictment to increase the prison 
term.  The defendant disputed most of the uncharged drug sales, 
but the federal district court ruled in favor of the government, 
increasing the sentencing guidelines range from two to eight 
months for the charged drug sales all the way up to eighty-four to 
105 months with the inclusion of the uncharged sales.  The 
district court sentenced the defendant to eighty-four months of 
imprisonment; on appeal, the First Circuit quickly dispatched the 
defendant’s arguments of error.  By all appearances, an open and 
shut case. 
Then comes the concurring opinion in St. Hill, penned by 
Judge Torruella.  It is not pedestrian.  Judge Torruella warns of “a 
disturbing trend in criminal prosecutions.  All too often, 
prosecutors charge individuals with relatively minor crimes, 
carrying correspondingly short sentences,” but then they use the 
“relevant conduct” mechanism in the sentencing guidelines to 
increase the term of imprisonment.4  Judge Torruella describes St. 
Hill as a typical example: the defendant pleaded guilty to 
distributing a small amount of drugs, but the government’s 
introduction of relevant conduct evidence during the sentencing 
phase subjected the defendant to “an additional six to eight years 
in prison due to isolated drug sales not directly related to the 
twenty oxycodone pills which led to his conviction, all of which he 
was never arrested for, never charged with, never pleaded guilty 
to, and never convicted of by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”5  
As Judge Torruella sees it, the defendant’s predicament in St. Hill 
 
 3.  Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, in drug sales cases 
like St. Hill, “relevant conduct” can include sales that are “part of the same 
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”  
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
 4.  St. Hill, 768 F.3d at 39 (Torruella, J., concurring). 
 5.  Id. at 40 (emphasis omitted). 
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is “the tail wagging the dog.”6  His solution to the problem is 
simple: “if the government intends to seek an increase in a 
criminal defendant’s sentence for conduct that independently may 
be subject to criminal liability, the government should charge that 
conduct in the indictment.”7 
In Judge Torruella’s view, the use of relevant conduct 
evidence at sentencing implicates two core constitutional rights 
afforded to criminal defendants—the right to due process and the 
right to a jury trial: 
The practice of arguing for higher sentences based on 
uncharged and untried “relevant conduct” . . . seems like 
an end-run around these basic constitutional guarantees 
afforded to all criminal defendants.  The government’s 
role is to ensure justice, both to the accused and to the 
public at large; it is not to maximize conviction rates and 
argue for the greatest possible sentence. And, while it is 
unclear to me whether this trend is due to shaky police 
work resulting in cases that cannot be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt . . . or other less nefarious factors, it 
remains troubling regardless.8 
The concurrence in St. Hill is remarkable juxtaposed against 
existing federal law.  The defendant in St. Hill was convicted of 
illegal drug distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), 
which carries no mandatory minimum and a maximum sentence 
of twenty years.  Post-Booker,9 the federal sentencing guidelines 
are advisory, not mandatory, and sentencing courts have wide 
discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory 
authorization.10  As long as the sentence does not increase a 
mandatory minimum or enhance a maximum sentence, a well-
reasoned sentencing decision is virtually immune from attack.11  
Such was the case in St. Hill where the defendant was sentenced 
to seven years—a term of imprisonment well within the 
authorized statutory range.  Even Judge Torruella, in the midst of 
 
 6.  Id.  
 7.  Id. at 41 (emphasis omitted). 
 8.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 9.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 10.  See, e.g., United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 11.  See United States v. Vargas-Garcia, 794 F.3d 162, 165–67 (1st Cir. 
2015); United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284, 293 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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expressing displeasure about the use of relevant conduct to 
increase jail terms, affirmed the defendant’s sentence as 
consistent with binding federal precedent.12 
The concerns posed by Judge Torruella are familiar to those 
acquainted with Rhode Island’s probation violation system.  The 
amorphous trigger that results in a probation violation is usually 
the defendant’s failure to “keep the peace” or “maintain good 
behavior.”13  Like the “relevant conduct” conundrum that 
distressed Judge Torruella, a probation violation in Rhode Island 
can be used to drastically increase prison time with limited due 
process, no jury trial and allegations that would not support a 
criminal conviction. 
The bare-bones requirements for probation violation hearings 
originate from the tandem United States Supreme Court decisions 
in Morrissey v. Brewer,14 and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.15  Morrissey set 
the minimum due process required for parole revocation hearings 
and Gagnon extended its reasoning to probation revocation.16 
Rhode Island courts have used the reasoning in Morrissey and 
Gagnon as building blocks to flesh out procedural and substantive 
rights at probation violation hearings.17 
 
 12.  St. Hill, 768 F.3d at 42 (Torruella, J., concurring) (“Nevertheless, as 
a judge, it is my responsibility to faithfully apply the law as articulated by 
both the Supreme Court and this court, and I do not dispute that both the 
Guidelines and our interpretation of them currently condone this 
questionable process.”). 
 13.  See, e.g., State v. Barrientos, 88 A.3d 1130, 1133 (R.I. 2014). 
 14.  408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
 15.  411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
 16.  Together, Gagnon and Morrissey hold that due process requires that 
parole and probation violation hearings include: (a) “written notice of the 
claimed violations”; (b) disclosure to the defendant of “evidence against him”; 
(c) “opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence”; (d) “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses” (unless there is “good cause for not allowing confrontation”); (e) “a 
neutral and detached” decision-maker; and (f) “a written statement by the 
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole” or 
probation.  Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. 
 17.  These cases represent the first and last time the United States 
Supreme Court addressed probation violation hearings in any detailed way.  
Many commentators have discussed Morrissey and Gagnon and there is no 
need to do so again here.  See, e.g., Andrew M. Hladio & Robert J. Taylor, 
Parole, Probation and Due Process, 70 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 168, 172–75 (1999); 
Esther K. Hong, Friend or Foe? The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
in Post-Conviction Formal Revocation Proceedings, 66 SMU L. REV. 227, 233 
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Rhode Island courts consider probation violation hearings to 
be civil (not criminal) proceedings.18  Due process rights are 
limited because the defendant has already been convicted of a 
crime.19  The State must prove a probation violation by 
“reasonably satisfactory” evidence, a standard much lower than 
beyond a reasonable doubt.20  The violation hearing is conducted 
in summary fashion by the judge, in theory to be held within ten 
days of when the defendant is charged with the probation 
violation.21  There is no right to a preliminary hearing and the 
defendant can be (and usually is) held without bail pending the 
violation hearing.22  A judge conducts the probation violation 
hearing and there is no right to jury trial.23  The pre-trial criminal 
rules of discovery do not apply.24  The rules of evidence do not 
apply.25  The exclusionary rule does not apply and the State can 
rely on illegally-obtained evidence.26  Hearsay can be admissible 
and the defendant does not have an absolute right to cross-
examine witnesses.27  Essentially, the defendant has the right to 
notice of the hearing, notice of the claimed violation, and the 
opportunity to be heard and present evidence.28  Although 
probation violation hearings are considered civil proceedings—
where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach29—
the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all 
cases, apparently on state constitutional grounds.30  Double 
 
(2013); Mary T. Casey, Note, Due Process in Probation Revocation v. Self-
Incrimination: A Comparative Perspective for the Massachusetts Probationer, 
17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181, 184 (1991).  
 18.  E.g., State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 408 (R.I. 2008). 
 19.  State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 29 (R.I. 2009). 
 20.  State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005). 
 21.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006); State v. Lancellotta, 35 A.3d 
863, 867 (R.I. 2012); State v. Lawrence, 658 A.2d 890, 892 (R.I. 1995). 
 22.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9; see State v. DeLomba, 370 A.2d 1273, 1275 
(R.I. 1977). 
 23.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9. 
 24.  State v. Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 1050 (R.I. 2012). 
 25.  R.I. R. EVID. 101(b)(3). 
 26.  See State v. White, 37 A.3d 120, 121 (R.I. 2012). 
 27.  State v. Casiano, 667 A.2d 1233, 1239 (R.I. 1995). 
 28.  Delarosa, 39 A.3d at 1051.   
 29.  Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D.R.I. 2003) 
(“[T]here is no constitutional right to counsel of one’s choice in civil cases.”). 
 30.  State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 30 (R.I. 2009); see State v. Chabot, 682 
A.2d 1377, 1379 (R.I. 1996) (describing right to counsel as “constitutional 
safeguard” in probation violation proceeding).  This standard is stronger than 
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jeopardy and collateral estoppel do not attach; a defendant found 
not guilty of a probation violation may still be prosecuted for a 
crime based on the same conduct.31  Conversely, a defendant who 
is criminally convicted for the same conduct that forms the basis 
for the probation violation renders “moot” a challenge to a 
probation violation.32 
Against this procedural backdrop, under Rhode Island law, 
any probation violation proven to the “reasonable satisfaction”33 of 
the court that occurs at any time during the probationary period 
can lead to revocation and imposition of a portion or the entire 
suspended sentence imposed at the sentencing on the underlying 
crime.34  To illustrate, a defendant sentenced to two years to serve 
with eight years suspended with probation (a common type of 
sentence in Rhode Island) will serve the remainder of the ten-year 
term on probation upon release after two years in prison (or less 
with parole and good time credits).35  If, on the ninth year and 
364th day after the imposition of the sentence, the defendant 
violates probation, the defendant can be sentenced to up to eight 
years in prison based on the suspended sentence.36  This is not an 
empty threat; in one case, a Rhode Island court sentenced a 
 
that required by the Due Process Clause for probation proceedings; the 
United States Supreme Court has held that an attorney may be required, but 
ultimately “the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis.”  
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 763 (1973). 
 31.  State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 358, 361 (R.I. 2005). 
 32.  State v. Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 623 (R.I. 2007). 
 33.  See, e.g., State v. Gromkiewicz, 43 A.3d 45, 48 (R.I. 2012). 
 34.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006); State v. Parson, 844 A.2d 178, 180 
(R.I. 2004). 
 35.  Most prisoners are eligible for parole after serving one third of their 
jail sentence.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-9.  Most, but not all, prisoners can also 
earn up to ten days of good credit per month depending on the length of their 
sentence.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-56-24(b); see also Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 
909 (R.I. 2014).  The federal system does not have parole, but prisoners are 
eligible for good time credits that can reduce their time in custody by fifty-
four days a year.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2012); Hackley v. Bledsoe, 350 F. 
App’x 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The Sentencing Reform Act created new 
sentencing procedures in the federal system, replacing ‘indeterminate 
sentences and the possibility of parole with determinate sentencing and no 
parole.’” (quoting Lyons v. Mendez, 303 F.3d 285, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2002))).  
Federal prisoners can also serve up to the last twelve months of their term on 
“prelease custody” at a community correctional facility to aid reentry.  18 
U.S.C. § 3624(c)(1).  
 36.  See Parson, 844 A.2d at 180; see also Rose, 92 A.3d at 919. 
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defendant to serve an entire nine-year suspended sentence in 
prison, after he was previously released from a six-year jail 
term.37  His probation violation: moving out of Rhode Island in 
violation of probation conditions.38  Appellate review of a 
probation revocation decision is limited to whether the lower court 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in assessing the credibility of 
witnesses or in finding a probation violation.39  The sentencing 
court “possess[es] wide latitude in deciding whether a probation 
violator’s suspended sentence should be removed in whole, in part, 
or not at all.”40 
Seen from this perspective, as the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has aptly noted, a probationer lives under “the sword of 
Damocles, [where] the unexecuted portion of a probationer’s 
suspended sentence hangs over his or her head by the single 
horsehair of good behavior, until such time as the term of 
probation expires.”41  Probationers, especially those who face new 
criminal charges, feel a strong gravitational pull from the reduced 
procedural protections to admit to new criminal charges in hopes 
of a reduced sentence and period of incarceration, regardless of 
whether the evidence against them is sound or not. 
The question that lingers, and the subject of this Article, is 
whether the discomfort about federal sentencing expressed by 
Judge Torruella in St. Hill can provide insight into the Rhode 
Island probation violation system.  As framed by a recent 
Symposium at the Roger Williams University School of Law, the 
current architecture of Rhode Island’s probationary rules has 
triggered a cycle of mass incarceration.  According to the most 
recent U.S. Department of Justice statistics, Rhode Island has 
2793 adults on probation per 100,000 adult residents, the second 
highest ratio in the country behind Georgia.42  This Article asks 
whether the issues identified in the St. Hill concurrence and a 
 
 37.  See State v. Murray, 22 A.3d 385, 387 & n.1 (R.I. 2011). 
 38.  Id. at 386. 
 39.  State v. Prout, 116 A.3d 196, 202 (R.I. 2015); State v. Horton, 971 
A.2d 606, 610 (R.I. 2009). 
 40.  State v. Jackson, 966 A.2d 1225, 1230 (R.I. 2009) (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Christodal, 946 A.2d 811, 817 (R.I. 2008)). 
 41.  Parson, 844 A.2d at 180. 
 42.  DANIELLE KAEBLE, LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, app. 
tbl. 4, at 17 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus14.pdf. 
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fresh look at related legal conundrums might lead to a more 
efficient Rhode Island probation system that protects the public 
and preserves the rights of criminal defendants, while 
simultaneously reducing mass incarceration.43 
This Article analyzes the Rhode Island probation system 
chronologically starting with the sentencing on the underlying 
crime.  It moves on to discuss the conditions imposed while the 
defendant is on probation, the initial charging decision that 
alleges the defendant violated probation, the defendant’s prospects 
for bail pending the violation hearing, the burden of proof at the 
probation violation hearing, and the sentencing on the violation.  
The Article concludes with thoughts on revisions to the probation 
system that might minimize concerns about reduced due process 
and the absence of a jury trial.  Along the way, the article 
compares the Rhode Island system to analogous aspects of the 
federal system for defendants under supervision, based on the 
common practice of Rhode Island courts to look to federal law as 
persuasive authority on similar issues.44 
I. THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE FOR THE UNDERLYING CRIME 
The Rhode Island probation violation cycle begins with the 
sentence for the original crime.  The sentencing court has 
discretion “to impose a sentence and suspend the execution of the 
sentence, in whole or in part, or place the defendant on probation 
without the imposition of a suspended sentence.  The suspension 
shall place the defendant on probation for the time and on any 
terms and conditions that the court may fix.”45  In practice, the 
sentence typically includes probation regardless of whether the 
defendant is incarcerated.46  In many instances, the defendant is 
 
 43.  To be clear, the Rhode Island probation system as it currently exists 
has tangible benefits.  This Article is meant to pose questions about the legal 
structure of the probation system. 
 44.  See, e.g., Weeks v. 735 Putnam Pike Operations, LLC, 85 A.3d 1147, 
1156 n.11 (R.I. 2014); Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 300 (R.I. 2007); 
State v. Damiano, 587 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I. 1991); Johnson v. Mullen, 390 A.2d 
909, 912 (R.I. 1978). 
 45.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8(a) (2006 & Supp. 2015).  The rule is the 
same for state district court except that the statute is tailored for 
misdemeanor crimes and limits probation to one year unless otherwise 
permitted by law.  See id. § 12-19-13.  
 46.  Rhode Island sentencing practices include several variations of 
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sentenced to a relatively short period of incarceration (or no prison 
time at all) followed by a long suspended sentence coupled with a 
term of probation that matches the length of suspended sentence.  
This is the prevailing sentencing practice in Rhode Island.  
Although there is no statutory requirement that the length of 
probation match the length of the suspended sentence,47 Rhode 
Island’s reported decisions are chock-full of this phenomenon and 
it occurs in nearly one hundred percent of all sentences that have 
a term of commitment and probation.48  The following are a few 
examples, organized by the length of the overall sentence: 
1) Two years suspended with two years probation for 
domestic felony assault;49 
2) Five years of imprisonment at the Adult Correctional 
 
probation in addition to deferred sentences.  Probationary sentences work in 
three different ways at the sentencing for the underlying crime.  First, 
defendants can receive probation in addition to a term of incarceration.  
Second, probation can be coupled with a suspended sentence that does not 
include any term of actual incarceration.  Third, defendants can be sentenced 
to “straight probation,” which means the court does not impose any actual 
prison term or suspended sentence, and will not do so if the defendant 
successfully completes the term of probation.  If the defendant violates 
straight probation, the defendant can be sentenced to anything authorized by 
the statute for the underlying crime.  A defendant with a deferred sentence is 
technically not on probation, but as a practical matter a deferred sentence 
operates the same as probation for the purposes of determining a sanction 
(like prison time) when a violation occurs.  See id. § 12-19-19(b) (“The 
determination of whether a violation has occurred shall be made by the court 
in accordance with procedures relating to violation of probation §§ 12-19-2 
and 12-19-14.”).  For the purposes of this Article, there is no practical 
difference between a deferred sentence and probation, except the length of 
the probationary term.  Probation can be any length up to the maximum term 
for the crime, while deferred sentences are capped at five years and are 
limited to defendants who have pleaded guilty or nolo contendere.  See id. §§ 
12-19-9, -19(a).   
 47.  Id. § 12-19-8(b).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated in 
dicta that a term of probation should be imposed along with a suspended 
sentence, but the court has never said that the length of probation must 
match the length of the suspended sentence.  See Lyons v. State, 43 A.3d 62, 
67 n.4 (R.I. 2012). 
 48.  COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., THIRD PRESENTATION TO RHODE 
ISLAND’S JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP 28 (Oct. 27, 2015), 
https://csgjusticecenter.org/jr/rhode-island/publications/third-presentation-to-
rhode-islands-justice-reinvestment-working-group/ [hereinafter JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP]. 
 49.  State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 461 (R.I. 1999). 
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Institutions (ACI), with six months to serve and four and 
one-half years suspended with probation for larceny over 
$500 and solicitation of another to commit a felony;50 
3) Eight years at the ACI, with one year to serve and 
seven years suspended with probation for entering a 
building with felonious intent;51 
4) Ten years at the ACI, with twenty-one days to serve 
and nine years and eleven months suspended with 
probation for delivery of cocaine and conspiracy to deliver 
cocaine;52 
5) Fifteen years at the ACI, with three to serve and 
twelve years suspended with probation for second-degree 
sexual assault;53 
6) Twenty-five years suspended with probation for one 
count of possession of cocaine;54 
7) Thirty years at the ACI, with seven and a half to serve 
and twenty two and a half suspended with probation for 
second-degree child molestation;55 
8) Forty years at the ACI, with twelve years to serve and 
twenty-eight years suspended with probation for arson 
and eight robbery charges;56 and 
9) Fifty years at the ACI, with ten years to serve and 
forty years suspended with probation for first-degree 
sexual assault.57 
The Rhode Island practice of long suspended sentences 
coupled with long periods of probation looks innocuous on paper 
and has an indicia of leniency.  Ultimately, however, the 
framework leads to significantly reduced due process for the many 
criminal defendants that cycle through the probation violation 
system. 
 
 50.  State v. Whiting, 115 A.3d 956, 957 (R.I. 2015). 
 51.  State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1067 (R.I. 2001). 
 52.  State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 883. (R.I. 2001). 
 53.  State v. Lawless, 996 A.2d 166, 166 (R.I. 2010). 
 54.  State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1998). 
 55.  State v. Armour, 110 A.3d 1195, 1198 (R.I. 2015). 
 56.  State v. Raso, 80 A.3d 33, 34 (R.I. 2013). 
 57.  State v. Texter, 896 A.2d 40, 43 n.2 (R.I. 2006). 
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One of the teachings from the United States Supreme Court 
decisions in Morrissey and Gagnon decided in 1972 and 1973 is 
that probation is an “act of grace” that subjects the defendant to 
“conditional liberty,” and therefore, probationers facing revocation 
have limited due process rights.58  Rhode Island courts have 
employed this reasoning regularly to justify reduced due process 
at probation violation hearings.  Under Rhode Island law, a 
suspended sentence is considered an “act of grace” under which 
the defendant “retains his liberty, conditioned however on such 
probationary terms as the court may impose.”59  Probationers are 
afforded limited due process rights “by virtue of the fact that the 
defendant has already been convicted of a crime.”60  “It is well 
established that a probation-violation hearing is not part of the 
criminal-prosecution process and thus is not entitled to the full 
panoply of due-process rights.”61  A probation violation proceeding 
is more of a hearing on re-sentencing than a taking of rights as 
“the hearing is a continuation of the original prosecution for which 
probation was imposed.”62  Rhode Island courts further hold 
probation revocations deprive defendants not of absolute liberty, 
but only of the “conditional liberty that may be revoked if they 
violate the terms of the probation agreement.”63  Because 
probation is an act of grace, the “‘full panoply of rights’ applicable 
to a defendant at a criminal proceeding does not apply at a 
violation or revocation hearing.”64 
Notwithstanding Rhode Island courts’ interpretation of the 
 
 58.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.4, 789 (1973); see also 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480–89 (1972). 
 59.  Tillinghast v. Howard, 287 A.2d 749, 751–52 (R.I. 1972).   
 60.  State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 29 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. 
Sampson, 884 A.2d 399, 404 (R.I. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61.  State v. Olsen, 610 A.2d 1099, 1103 (R.I. 1992). 
 62.  State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 455 (R.I. 2000); State v. Lawrence, 
658 A.2d 890, 892 (R.I. 1995); see also United States v. Czajak, 909 F.2d 20, 
24 (1st Cir. 1990) (opining that a probation revocation hearing is similar to “a 
re-sentencing hearing than a taking of rights”). 
 63.  State v. Gobern, 423 A.2d 1177, 1179 (R.I. 1981); see also Czajak, 909 
F.2d at 24 (“[R]evocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to 
which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly 
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 64.  State v. Salvail, 362 A.2d 135, 138 (1976) (quoting Morrissey, 408 
U.S. at 480)). 
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teachings of Morrissey and Gagnon, Rhode Island’s sentencing 
practice of long probationary periods with equally long suspended 
sentences calls into question the justification for the limited due 
process afforded to probationers facing violations.  While Rhode 
Island courts are technically sentencing defendants to long prison 
sentences and suspending a large portion of those sentences as 
“act[s] of grace,” in practice they are imposing shorter prison 
sentences followed by long periods of probation.  When the 
defendant cycles back through the criminal justice system at a 
probation violation hearing, the new prison term facing the 
defendant often has lost the legal moorings that justify the 
reduced process and proof required.  The defendant has already 
served the time in prison intended by the sentencing court for the 
original crime.  A new prison sentence based on a probation 
violation is precisely that: a new sentence prompted by new 
allegations.  Suspended sentences are so long that the options 
available to the court for sentencing at a violation hearing are not 
that much different from the original sentencing on the 
underlying crime. 
No one at the original sentencing—not the prosecutor, judge, 
defendant, or defense counsel—believes the case against the 
defendant is worth serving the entire term (the term to serve plus 
the suspended term) in prison.  This is clarified by Rhode Island’s 
use of non-mandatory “benchmark” guidelines for criminal 
sentencing that set the starting point for the length of the prison 
term.65  As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated, the “time 
 
 65.  The sentencing benchmarks were originally drafted in 1981 by a 
committee appointed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.  See JOHN A. 
MACFADYEN & BARBARA HURST, RHODE ISLAND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32.2, at 
303 (1993).  The sentencing benchmarks are not mandatory; they are “a guide 
to proportionality.”  State v. Snell, 11 A.3d 97, 102 (R.I. 2011).  The 
sentencing court “is bound only by the statutory limits.”  State v. Coleman, 
984 A.2d 650, 655 (R.I. 2009) (quoting State v. Bettencourt, 766 A.2d 391, 394 
(R.I. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The benchmarks encourage 
the sentencing court to consider various factors, including: 
“[T]he severity of the crime, the defendant’s personal, educational, 
and employment background, the potential for rehabilitation, social 
deterrence, and the appropriateness of the punishment.”  The 
sentencing benchmarks allow departure “when substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist.”  If a trial justice sentences a 
defendant outside the recommended range, the benchmarks instruct 
the trial justice to “give specific reasons for the departure on the 
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ranges given in the sentencing benchmarks represent time to be 
served in jail.”66  Likewise, the text of the sentencing benchmarks 
stresses that “[t]he use of suspended sentences, probation, and 
fines, in addition, is not precluded.”67  Stated another way, there 
is no sentencing benchmark for the imposition of a suspended 
sentence or the length of the probationary term that comes with it.  
The primary focus at sentencing is on the length of the term to 
serve.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained that, if a 
benchmark calls for three years in prison, a sentence of three 
years to serve with twelve years suspended with probation is 
entirely consistent with the benchmarks.68 
The only limitation on the length of a suspended sentence or a 
probation term is the statutory maximum for the crime.69  The 
result is a customary sentencing practice in Rhode Island where 
the prison term frequently comports with the benchmarks, but 
where the probationary sentence is equal in length to a long 
suspended sentence.  This occurs with little statutory or 
benchmarks guidance on whether it makes sense to place a 
defendant on probation for a prolonged period, which, in turn, 
could lead to another long stint in jail from a suspended sentence, 
when the defendant has already served a jail sentence for the 
 
record.”  Examples of compelling circumstances provided in the 
sentencing benchmarks include a defendant’s prior criminal record, 
lack of remorse, whether the defendant testified, and if he or she 
testified and gave patently false testimony, and “other substantial 
grounds” which tend to mitigate or aggravate the offender’s 
culpability.  Further, the sentencing benchmarks explicitly allow for 
a sentencing departure based on a defendant’s criminal history.  
Id. (first quoting Bettencourt, 766 A.2d at 394; then quoting R.I. R. SUPER. CT. 
SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶ 1, 1(q)).  In practice: 
The use of benchmarks by judges now varies widely, with some 
judges utilizing them in nearly all cases, and others consistently 
imposing sentences greatly in excess of the guidelines.  To some 
degree, as a practical matter, the benchmarks have become a 
minimum range for sentences after trial for the enumerated crimes; 
and it is more usual to see sentences persistently in excess of the 
benchmark than it is to see them significantly lower than those 
recommended.   
MACFADYEN & HURST, supra note 65, § 32.2, at 302–03.   
 66.  State v. Ibrahim, 862 A.2d 787, 794 (R.I. 2004).   
 67.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶ 4. 
 68.  Ibrahim, 862 A.2d at 794. 
 69.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8(b) (2006). 
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underlying crime.70 
This sentencing rubric explains many of the long suspended 
sentences in Rhode Island, where the suspended sentence and 
probation term is longer than the jail term, and the overall length 
of suspended sentences imposed is 3.5 times longer than the 
length of incarceration.71  A criminal defendant convicted of one 
count for felony assault, for example, would not be sentenced to 
fifteen years as the defendant was in State v. Rieger,72 if the court 
intended all fifteen years to be served in prison.  Rather, the 
highest prison sentence articulated by the sentencing benchmarks 
for felony assault is five years;73 the Rieger Court sentenced the 
defendant to four years in prison with eleven years suspended.74 
This sentencing practice is different from the federal system.  
Under federal law, probationary sentences are available only for 
defendants who do not serve prison time; incarcerated defendants 
receive sentences of supervised release after prison.75  Probation 
terms are capped at five years and are frequently shorter.76  
Supervised release terms following prison are usually three years 
 
 70.  On March 16, 2016, two days before the final draft of this Article 
went to press, the Presiding Justice of the Rhode Island Superior Court 
submitted to the Rhode Island Supreme Court proposed amendments to 
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Superior Court 
Sentencing Benchmarks.  See Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed 
Amendments to the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks (Mar. 16, 2016) 
[hereinafter Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments],     
https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/SupremeMiscOrders/Order-
ProposedAmendmentsSuperiorCourtRulesofCriminalProcedure-Sentencing 
Benchmarks3-16-16.pdf.  At press time, the proposed amendments were in a 
public comment period scheduled to end on April 12, 2016.  The proposal 
would add language to the sentencing benchmarks to de-couple the 
probationary sentence from the suspended sentence.  
 71.  JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP, supra note 48, at 27. 
 72.  763 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 2001). 
 73.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶¶ 8–10. 
 74.  Rieger, 763 A.2d at 1000. 
 75.  Technically, probation differs between the state and federal system 
in the sense that probation is considered a criminal conviction in the federal 
system while a sentence of probation without more is not a conviction under 
Rhode Island law when it follows a plea of nolo contendere.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 
12-18-3(a). Nevertheless, probation following a plea of nolo contendere is 
considered a conviction for the purposes of criminal expungement under 
Rhode Island law.  See State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 765 n.2 (R.I. 1999). 
 76.  18 U.S.C. § 3561(c) (2012). 
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and the statutory cap is five years for most crimes.77  A violation 
of probation or supervised release subjects a federal defendant to 
less jail time than the state system.  If a federal defendant 
violates probation or supervised release, the term of incarceration 
is usually under one year unless the conduct that forms the basis 
of the violation is a serious felony.78  The maximum sentence 
allowed in the federal system for a supervised release violation is 
five years for most crimes.79 
In essence, the prison term—not the suspended sentence and 
probation portion of the sentence—is the main driver in Rhode 
Island state courts at the sentencing for the original crime.  The 
suspended sentence and probation are afterthoughts that 
represent a battle to be fought later if the defendant faces a 
probation violation hearing.  This is not substantially different 
from the federal system.  Typically, as Judge Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit has explained, a federal criminal defendant is 
concerned with jail time and does not exert much effort at the 
original sentencing in challenging overly burdensome conditions 
that will be imposed upon release from prison: 
Because conditions of supervised release do not take 
effect until the defendant completes his prison term and 
is released, defendants given long prison sentences—and 
long prison sentences are common in federal sentencing—
often have little interest in contesting conditions of 
supervised release at sentencing. Criminals who court 
long prison sentences tend to have what economists call a 
 
 77.  Id. § 3583(b). 
 78.  See id. § 3583(e)(3).  In the federal system, when the probation or 
supervised release violation results in a term of incarceration on a separate 
criminal charge, the court has discretion to impose the sentence consecutively 
to the prison sentence imposed for the separate crime.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Fannin, 562 F. App’x 457, 458 (6th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Taylor, 628 F.3d 420, 425 (7th Cir. 2010); see also U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
 79.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).  Probation violators can be sentenced to 
anything allowed by the statute for the original crime that resulted in the 
sentence of probation, although the United States Sentencing Guidelines call 
for much shorter sentences that are consistent with supervised release 
violations.  See id. § 3565; United States v. De Jesus, 277 F.3d 609, 611 (1st 
Cir. 2002).  Probation sentences are relatively rare in the federal system, 
mainly because the government tends to prosecute only more serious crimes 
that generally warrant incarceration.   
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high discount rate.  That is, they give little weight to 
future costs and benefits.  Defendants or their lawyers 
may also worry that a successful challenge to a condition 
or conditions of supervised release may induce the judge 
to impose a longer prison sentence, thinking that 
resistance to supervised release implies recidivist 
tendencies or intentions.80 
Despite the lack of focus on the suspended sentence, it is a part of 
the judgment under Rhode Island law and a “conviction for all 
purposes.”81  “[I]t is actually imposed; only its execution is held in 
abeyance.”82 
Ostensibly, the conditional liberty granted to Rhode Island 
defendants through suspended sentences and probation is for the 
opportunity to rehabilitate while on probation.83  In reality, the 
current sentencing practice of tying the length of the probationary 
term to the length of the suspended sentence bears little relation 
to the stated goal of rehabilitation.  It is difficult, for example, to 
justify a twenty-five year term of probation for possession of 
cocaine84 as having anything to do with rehabilitation.  A person 
does not require twenty-five years, roughly a third of a lifetime, to 
rehabilitate from the crime of drug possession. 
At bottom, concerns with Rhode Island’s probation system 
begin with the original sentencing.  A long suspended sentence is 
the primary threat to a defendant facing a long probationary 
period, but it often cannot be justified as necessary for 
rehabilitation.  The long suspended sentence is also the driver of 
the events that follow; because of the criminal conviction, the 
defendant receives reduced due process rights at all phases of a 
 
 80.  United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015).  
 81.  State v. Parson, 844 A.2d. 178, 180 (R.I. 2004) (quoting MACFADYEN 
& HURST, RHODE ISLAND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32.9, at 308–09 n.2) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 82.  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting MACFADYEN & HURST, RHODE 
ISLAND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32.9, at 308–09 n.2) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 83.  See Tillinghast v. Howard, 287 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I. 1972); Andrew 
Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences: Overincarceration and 
the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753, 756–64 (2010) [hereinafter 
The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences] (explaining that the primary 
purpose of probation is not rehabilitation). 
 84.  See State v. Pena-Lora, 710 A.2d 1262, 1264 (R.I. 1998). 
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probation violation proceeding.85  Long suspended sentences 
accompanied by probation are justified as an act of grace, but the 
sentences are imposed in a problematic way given the limited due 
process rights that flow from the so-called act of grace.  One small 
tremor can disturb the defendant’s “conditional liberty”86 and 
sever the single horse-hair holding the Sword of Damocles above 
the defendant’s head, with significant criminal consequences. 
II. FAIR NOTICE OF PROBATION CONDITIONS 
A criminal defendant sentenced to probation is exposed to 
additional jail time pursuant to the terms and conditions of 
probation as set by the sentencing court.  If the defendant violates 
a condition, the court may revoke probation and incarcerate the 
defendant for any portion of the remaining suspended sentence.87 
To avoid the threat of additional jail time, criminal 
defendants in Rhode Island must comply with three varieties of 
probation conditions: implied, general, and special.88  Turning 
first to the implied conditions of probation, these are the 
requirements to “keep the peace” and “remain on good behavior.”89  
Keeping the peace and remaining on good behavior are “conditions 
inherent in the very privilege of probation.”90  They “come into 
existence at the very moment that a sentence that includes 
probation is imposed,” even if the defendant is incarcerated and 
the probationary sentence has yet to begin, and continue for the 
duration of the probationary sentence.91  Keeping the peace and 
remaining on good behavior are imposed on all defendants 
regardless of whether the sentencing court exercises its 
 
 85.  See State v. Gilbert, 984 A.2d 26, 29 (R.I. 2009); State v. Tucker, 747 
A.2d 451, 455 (R.I. 2000). 
 86.  Tucker, 747 A.2d at 455. 
 87.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-19-8(a), -9, -13, -14 (2006 & Supp. 2015); see 
Tucker, 747 A.2d at 455. 
 88.  See State v. Baton, 688 A.2d 824, 825 (R.I. 1997) (“[A]n implied 
condition of good behavior arises immediately upon the imposition of a 
suspended sentence.”); Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 917 n.20 (R.I. 2014) 
(Flaherty, J., dissenting) (general conditions); State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 
318, 320 (R.I. 2008) (special conditions). 
 89.  State v. Prout, 116 A.3d 196, 202 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v. 
Barrientos, 88 A.3d 1130, 1133 (R.I. 2014)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 90.  Price v. Wall, 31 A.3d 995, 1002 (R.I. 2011). 
 91.  State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 339 (R.I. 1997).  
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prerogative to outline other probation conditions.92 
Second, the defendant must comply with the general 
conditions of probation.  These “includ[e] reporting to the 
[probation officer] as required; not breaking any laws; not 
traveling or moving out of Rhode Island without advance 
approval; advising the [probation officer] of any change of address 
immediately; and so on.”93  Like the implied conditions, these 
general conditions are imposed on all supervised probationers.  
However, unlike the implied conditions of keeping the peace and 
good behavior, general conditions are more specific and technical 
in nature. 
Third, the sentencing court can impose special conditions as 
needed on a case-by-case basis.  For example, in a child 
molestation case, the sentencing court might set special conditions 
such as “a no-contact order,” “registration as a sex offender,” and 
“attendance at sex-offender counseling,” some of which are 
required by statute for certain crimes.94  Other special conditions 
include counseling for substance abuse, mental health, and anger 
management.95 
 
 92.  Price, 31 A.3d at 1003. 
 93.  Rose, 92 A.3d at 917 n.20 (alterations in original).  The current 
version of the probation form used in Rhode Island lists the standard 
conditions as: (1) obey all laws; (2) report to probation officer as directed; (3) 
remain within the State of Rhode Island, except with the prior approval of 
the probation officer; (4) notify the probation officer immediately of any 
change in address, telephone number, or employment and inform them of 
whereabouts and activities as required; (5) make every effort to keep steadily 
employed, attend school, and/or attend vocational training; (6) waive 
extradition from anywhere in the United States if required to appear in any 
Rhode Island Court; (7) provide a DNA sample if required by state law; and 
(8) fulfill any and all Special Conditions of Probation as ordered by the Court.  
State of R.I. Dept. of Corr., Adult Probation and Parole Conditions of 
Supervised Probation (rev. Mar. 2015), http://www.interstatecompact.org/ 
StateDocs/ConditionsofSupervision.aspx. 
 94.  State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 320 (R.I. 2008); see also R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 11-37.1-3, -8.2.1 (2006 & Supp. 2015) (requiring sex offender 
registration and treatment for certain crimes). 
 95.  The current version of the Rhode Island probation form lists the 
special conditions as including but not limited to: (1) substance abuse 
counseling; (2) mental health counseling; (3) alcohol counseling; (4) AIDS 
testing/education; (5) sex offender counseling; (6) batterer’s intervention 
program; (7) anger management counseling; (8) community service; (9) 
restitution; (10) no contact order; (11) sex offender registration; and (12) 
other.  State of R.I. Dept. of Corr., supra note 93. 
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Federal practice includes general, standard and special 
conditions for probation and supervised release analogous to 
Rhode Island law, but the federal system has nothing similar to 
the implied conditions of good behavior and keeping the peace.  
General conditions are set by statute and include “the defendant 
[shall] not commit another Federal, State, or local crime during 
the term of supervision[,] . . . unlawfully possess a controlled 
substance[,] . . . [and] refrain from any unlawful use of a 
controlled substance and submit to a drug test within 15 days of 
release on supervised release and at least 2 periodic drug tests 
thereafter (as determined by the court) for use of a controlled 
substance.”96  The federal sentencing court also can set standard97 
 
 96.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2012); see also id. § 3563(a)(1), (b); U.S. Fed. 
Courts, Judgment in a Criminal Case Form AO 245B (rev. Feb. 1, 2016), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/forms/criminal-judgment-forms/judgment-criminal-
case. 
 97.  The standard conditions of supervision in the federal system are: (1) 
the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the permission of 
the court or probation officer; (2) shall report to the probation officer in a 
manner and frequency directed by the court or probation officer; (3) answer 
truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer and follow the instructions of 
the probation officer; (4) support his or her dependents and meet other family 
responsibilities; (5) work regularly at a lawful occupation, unless excused by 
the probation officer for schooling, training, or other acceptable reasons; (6) 
notify the probation officer at least ten days prior to any change in residence 
or employment; (7) refrain from excessive use of alcohol and shall not 
purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any controlled substance or 
any paraphernalia related to any controlled substances, except as prescribed 
by a physician; (8) not frequent places where controlled substances are 
illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered; (9) not associate with any 
persons engaged in criminal activity and shall not associate with any person 
convicted of a felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation 
officer; (10) permit a probation officer to visit him or her at any time at home 
or elsewhere and shall permit confiscation of any contraband observed in 
plain view of the probation officer; (11) notify the probation officer within 
seventy-two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement 
officer; (12) not enter into any agreement to act as an informer or a special 
agent of a law enforcement agency without the permission of the court; and 
(13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify third 
parties of risks that may be occasioned by the defendant’s criminal record or 
personal history or characteristics and shall permit the probation officer to 
make such notifications and to confirm the defendant’s compliance with such 
notification requirement.  Federal defendants are also generally prohibited 
from possessing firearms, destructive devices or other dangerous weapons.  
See Judgment in a Criminal Case Form AO 245B, supra note 96; see also 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(g). 
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and special98 conditions, provided they involve no greater 
deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary (among other 
factors).99  The conditions are provided to a federal defendant in 
writing and are required to be “sufficiently clear and specific to 
serve as a guide for the defendant’s conduct and for such 
supervision as is required.”100 
In contrast to Rhode Island’s implied probation conditions, 
there are no open-ended conditions in the federal system like 
keeping the peace and good behavior.  Ironically, good behavior 
becomes a factor in the federal system only when the sentencing 
court seeks to reduce the term of supervised release because the 
criminal defendant exhibits good behavior.101 
Unlike general and special conditions imposed on Rhode 
Island defendants that raise no serious concerns if they are 
unambiguous and reasonable infringements on liberty, the 
implied conditions of keeping the peace and good behavior are 
problematic because it is not clear what these terms mean.  The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court has never defined them and courts 
interpret them factually on a case-by-case basis.  For fans of 
dictionaries to aid interpretation, Black’s Law Dictionary is 
equally murky; it contains no helpful definition for “good 
behavior,”102 and the definition of “keeping the peace” is “[t]o 
 
 98.  Special conditions of supervision often include requirements such as: 
(1) the defendant shall participate in and satisfactorily complete a program of 
substance-abuse treatment, on an inpatient and/or outpatient basis, 
including periodic testing (up to seventy-two drug tests per year), as 
approved by the probation office; (2) participate in and satisfactorily complete 
a program of mental-health treatment, as approved by the probation office; 
(3) spend the first three months on curfew with radio-frequency monitoring 
and be restricted to his or her residence from 9:00 PM to 7:00 AM; and (4) 
participate in a manualized behavioral program as directed by the probation 
office, either in group sessions led by a counselor or participation in a 
program administered by the probation office.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). 
 99.  Id. § 3583(d)(2) (2012); see also id. § 3563(b). 
 100.  Id. § 3583(f). 
 101.  See id. § 3583(e)(1)–(2) (2012); United States v. Pettus, 303 F.3d 480, 
483 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Etheridge, 999 F. Supp. 2d 192, 196 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 102.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “good behavior” as “[a] standard by 
which judges are considered fit to continue their tenure, consisting in the 
avoicance [sic] of criminal behavior” or “[o]rderly conduct, which in the 
context of penal law allows a prisoner to reduce the time spent in prison.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 808 (10th ed. 2014). 
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maintain law and order or to refrain from disturbing it,”103 
whatever that means. 
Rhode Island case law reveals a clear dichotomy between 
actions that constitute alleged crimes and those that do not.  The 
commission of a crime is a breach of keeping the peace and good 
behavior.  This is made clear by State v. Jacques, where the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court held that engagement in criminal acts is a 
violation of the implied conditions of probation.104  Participation 
in a murder for hire scheme, a felon in possession of a firearm, or 
a large scale credit card fraud scheme, for example, are crimes and 
breaches of keeping the peace and maintaining good behavior 
while on probation.105  Ironically, this bright line means little in 
practice, because Rhode Island’s general probation conditions 
already require criminal defendants to “not break[] any laws.”106  
The implied condition not to break any laws is redundant of the 
general condition not to break any laws.107 
Beyond the commission of a crime, the outer limits of good 
behavior and keeping the peace are undefined and Rhode Island 
courts have given conflicting signals over the years.  In State v. 
Wiggs, a 1993 case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court quoted 
extensively from the decision below, in which the superior court 
stated that to satisfy good behavior, a probationer’s conduct “must 
be not only lawful, it must be impeccable.”108  The quoted 
 
 103.  Id. at 1000. 
 104.  State v. Jacques, 554 A.2d 193, 195 (R.I. 1989); see also State v. 
Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 340 (R.I. 1997) (“The commission of a new crime 
violates an implied condition of probation and suggests that the defendant is 
a poor probation risk.” (quoting Commonwealth v. Miller, 516 A.2d 1263, 
1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 105.  See, e.g., State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 501 (R.I. 2013); State v. 
Maloney, 956 A.2d 499, 507 (R.I. 2008); State v. Tatro, 659 A.2d 106, 114 (R.I. 
1995). 
 106.  Rose v. State, 92 A.3d 903, 917 n.20 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 107.  The only concrete difference is that the implied conditions are 
enforceable as soon as the sentence is imposed, while the general conditions 
may not be enforceable until the probationary period begins and the 
defendant receives a list of probation conditions from the probation officer.  
As a practical matter, this nuance would only affect prisoners who violate the 
implied probation conditions of keeping the peace and good behavior while 
incarcerated—that is, before they are released and the term of probation 
begins.  Theoretically, it is also possible that a Rhode Island defendant 
sentenced to “unsupervised probation” might not be subject to a written 
general probation condition not to break any laws. 
 108.  635 A.2d 272, 274 (R.I. 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
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language in Wiggs from the superior court continues with the 
observation that “[p]robation is not a joke; a suspended sentence is 
not a joke.  A person can be violated for hanging around with the 
wrong people only.”109 
Wiggs sets a high bar and requires a probationer to be a 
model citizen above the average Rhode Islander not on probation.  
It is also a difficult standard to meet; in some neighborhoods, 
many residents have criminal records, making it difficult to avoid 
associating with the so-called “wrong people.”110  In State v. 
Forbes, decided in 2007, the Rhode Island Supreme Court took a 
markedly different approach.111  In Forbes, the State charged the 
defendant with first-degree sexual assault for rape while he was 
on probation.  The charge arose from allegations that the 
defendant made unwanted sexual advances at a house party; the 
police arrested him on the scene.  At the ensuing probation 
violation hearing, the superior court found that the defendant 
failed to keep the peace and maintain good behavior for several 
reasons: he approached a female acquaintance who had 
threatened to make trouble for him (she had accused him of 
fathering her child in the past); he took the woman’s cell phone 
and refused to return it when she demanded it back; he walked 
into the house where the victim was staying uninvited, he had a 
large knife on him; and he refused to get out of the passenger seat 
of a car when he was approached by a police officer.112  The 
superior court made these findings solely for the purpose of 
determining whether the defendant kept the peace and acted in 
good behavior, while avoiding making any findings on the pending 
charge of first-degree sexual assault.113  Against this backdrop, 
 
Gautier, 871 A.2d 347 (R.I. 2005). 
 109.  Wiggs, 635 A.2d at 274.  The superior court has made similar 
statements.  See, e.g., State v. Ford, No. P2-05-0083A, 2012 WL 3638916, at 
*11 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (“[T]he mere presence of a defendant at a 
crime can trigger a violation.”). 
 110.  Cf. Rick Guzman, An Argument for A Return to Plessy v. Ferguson: 
Why Illinois Should Reconsider the Doctrine of “Separate but Equal” Public 
Schools, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 149, 165 (2008) (“[A]pproximately one in four 
convicted felons returning from prison each year in Illinois returns to one of 
these eight (out of seventy-seven) neighborhoods in Chicago.”). 
 111.  State v. Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 931 (R.I. 2007). 
 112.  Id. at 933. 
 113.  Id. at 934. 
BALDWIN & THOMPSON FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  11:37 PM 
266 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 21:244 
the superior court revoked the defendant’s probation and 
sentenced him to his entire suspended sentence.114 
On appeal, the Forbes court reversed, reasoning that the 
evidence showed the defendant acted aggressively towards the 
victim later in the evening, but it did not support a finding that 
the defendant approached and threatened her, took her cell phone, 
or entered the house uninvited.  The court also noted that the 
defendant’s supposed large knife was in reality a small 
pocketknife that was legal to possess, and that “[c]arrying a small 
pocketknife is not in and of itself behavior constituting a failure to 
keep the peace.”115  With respect to the defendant’s arrest, despite 
the police officer’s testimony that the defendant stepped out of the 
car only after the officer threatened to smash the car windows, 
Forbes found the incident not a violation of good behavior because 
the defendant was not the driver of the vehicle and the police 
report stated he was arrested without incident.116 
Forbes is hard to reconcile with Wiggs.  Despite rejecting 
many of the lower court’s factual findings, on appeal the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court left intact that the defendant acted 
aggressively towards the victim later in the evening, and did not 
exit the vehicle as a passenger because he had rolled up the 
windows and locked the door before the police officer asked him to 
step out of the vehicle.  Whether these actions are criminal or not, 
they are not “impeccable behavior” and demonstrate a tendency to 
“hang around with the wrong people”—actions that Wiggs found 
sufficient to revoke probation.117 
 
 114.  Id. at 933. 
 115.  Id. at 935. 
 116.  Id. at 932–33. 
 117.  Forbes is also noteworthy because the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
chided the lower court for not making any findings at the probation violation 
hearing on the conduct that formed the basis for the first-degree sexual 
assault charge.  See id. at 935 (“Although the hearing justice correctly 
perceived that his role was not to determine the validity vel non of the first-
degree sexual assault charge, he unnecessarily avoided making any factual 
finding concerning the defendant’s conduct relative to that charge.”).  Forbes 
makes clear that it is not necessary to avoid factual questions at probation 
violation hearings that form the basis for a companion criminal charge.  
Forbes thus solidifies the legal fiction of the Rhode Island probation system 
that a defendant is violated for failing the keep the peace and maintaining 
good behavior, not for committing a crime, even when a defendant is violated 
for conduct that also is the basis for the underlying crime.  See infra Part VI.  
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A year after Forbes, in 2008, the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
decided State v. McCarthy, another case that gives conflicting 
signals on the meanings of keeping the peace and good behavior.  
In McCarthy, the defendant’s underlying crime of conviction was 
second-degree child molestation with special probation conditions 
that included a no-contact order and attendance at sex-offender 
counseling.118  The State alleged the defendant violated the terms 
of his probation by driving by the sex-offender counselor’s house 
(in the same town as one of his victims) while informing the 
counseling agency by phone that he was doing so, making the 
counselor feel threatened.  The State also alleged the defendant 
failed to keep an accurate travel log or report his whereabouts to 
his probation officer; did not attend sex-offender counseling 
sessions; and possessed a pair of female underwear in the lining of 
his coat when he was arrested for violating probation.119 
In McCarthy, the superior court determined that the 
discovery of underwear in the defendant’s coat, in and of itself, did 
not constitute failure to keep the peace or breach of good 
behavior.120  Similarly, the superior court reasoned that the 
defendant’s drive-by past the counselor’s house did not constitute 
a breach by itself, but the events surrounding the incident, such 
as his phone call to the agency giving notice of the drive by, raised 
serious questions.  The straw that broke the camel’s back, in the 
superior court’s view, was the defendant’s failure to stay involved 
and current with his sex offender counseling.  The superior court 
reasoned that while the underwear and the drive-by “would not be 
sufficient, if either had been standing alone, to merit a 
determination that defendant had breached a condition of his 
probation . . . the three allegations combined [the underwear, 
drive-by, and lack of counseling] amounted to a probation 
violation.”121  The superior court adjudged the defendant a 
probation violator and sentenced him to six years in prison based 
on his seventeen-year suspended sentence.122 
On appeal, the McCarthy court affirmed the end result but 
declined to rule on whether the underwear or the drive-by incident 
 
 118.  State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 319–20. (R.I. 2008). 
 119.  Id. at 320. 
 120.  Id. at 327. 
 121.  Id. at 328. 
 122.  Id. at 326. 
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constituted a breach of probation.123  Instead, McCarthy affirmed 
the probation revocation solely on the basis that the defendant 
failed to cooperate with the requirement for sex-offender 
counseling.124  The McCarthy court reasoned this “was a patent 
violation of a clear term of [the defendant’s] probation,” which the 
defendant was well aware of when he signed a document 
informing him of his probation conditions.125 
The majority opinion prompted a strong dissent from Justice 
Flaherty.  Before the drive-by incident, Justice Flaherty pointed 
out that because the defendant had partially complied with 
counseling his probation officers had decided not to charge him 
with a probation violation.126  The charge of technical non-
compliance with sex-offender counseling, which eventually 
emerged as the basis for adjudging the defendant a probation 
violator, was not added until the day of the probation violation 
hearing.127  Justice Flaherty found this sequence of events and 
the superior court’s reasoning troubling in several respects.  First, 
before the drive-by incident, the defendant’s lack of cooperation 
with counseling never prompted a probation violation charge.  
Second, the superior court combined two incidents that it found 
not to be violation of good behavior with a finding of partial 
compliance to determine that the defendant was a violator.  Third, 
Justice Flaherty found it troubling that the defendant tried to 
participate in treatment but encountered several obstacles, 
including a switch in therapists, financial and health problems, 
and his probation officer’s failure to work with him to overcome 
these hurdles.128  Justice Flaherty reasoned that “[i]t is the 
function of probation counselors to work with offenders to aid 
them in becoming productive and law-abiding members of society.  
Individuals on probation have not been model citizens; indeed, 
that is why they are on probation and under the supervision of 
 
 123.  Id. at 328. 
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 329–30 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 127.  Id. at 327–28 (majority opinion). 
 128.  Id. at 329–30 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).  One of the defendant’s 
probation officers in McCarthy was Gerald Silva.  In proceedings unrelated to 
McCarthy, the United States recently prosecuted Mr. Silva for receipt and 
possession of child pornography.  See United States v. Silva, 794 F.3d 173, 
176 (1st Cir. 2015).  
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probation officers in the first place.”129  Based on the defendant’s 
attempts at compliance with sex-offender counseling and the lack 
of a finding that he violated any other condition of probation, 
Justice Flaherty concluded that the defendant was not a probation 
violator. 
Reconciling the majority and dissent in McCarthy, the 
takeaway might be that if an action is not prohibited by a specific 
probation condition and does not constitute a crime, it does not 
constitute a breach of the peace or failure to remain on good 
behavior.  The majority specifically declined to find that the drive-
by incident and the underwear constituted a breach of good 
behavior.  Similarly, the dissent reasoned the defendant did not 
breach his probation conditions, and found that the defendant’s 
possession of female underwear, while “unsettling if not downright 
disturbing” given his status as a twice-convicted sex offender, was 
neither a violation of the law nor a breach of a probation 
condition.130  Both the majority and the dissent appear 
uncomfortable with finding a probation violation for conduct that 
is not clearly proscribed by a general or special condition. 
Later in 2008, after McCarthy, the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court issued State v. Pitts, a decision leaning in the opposite 
direction.131  In Pitts, the defendant’s underlying crime was first 
and second degree child molestation.132  While on probation, he 
was arrested for masturbating in the driver’s seat of a van near a 
school.133  At the ensuing probation revocation hearing, the 
superior court reasoned that the defendant could likely be 
convicted of disorderly conduct, but even if his behavior did not 
satisfy the elements of disorderly conduct, the manner in which 
the defendant exposed himself and his actions “clearly were 
inappropriate and not in keeping with the good behavior required 
of a probationer.”134  The superior court adjudged the defendant a 
violator and sentenced him to five years of his twenty-eight year 
suspended sentence.135 
 
 129.  McCarthy, 945 A.2d at 330 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). 
 130.  Id. at 329–30 n.9. 
 131.  State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242 (R.I. 2008). 
 132.  Id.  
 133.  Id. at 243. 
 134.  Id. at 244. 
 135.  Id.  
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On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, 
reasoning that “[i]rrespective of whether [the defendant] could be 
found guilty of disorderly conduct, there was sufficient evidence 
for the hearing justice to conclude that he had violated his 
probation by failing to keep the peace and remain on good 
behavior.”136  Pitts explained that “the fact that [the defendant] 
was engaged in a sexual act in a vehicle on a public highway, at a 
time when he was on probation for prior sex offenses, constituted 
a violation of the terms of his probation.  Especially in light of this 
defendant’s prior convictions for child sexual molestation, his 
masturbating in his van near a school undoubtedly does not meet 
the test of good behavior.”137  This finding is contrapposto to 
McCarthy.  McCarthy and Pitts both assumed the conduct forming 
the basis for the probation revocation was not criminal.  Under 
McCarthy, a child molester can carry female underwear around in 
his jacket (which is “disturbing”) and drive by his sex offender 
counselor’s house in a threatening manner—all without fear of 
probation revocation; while under Pitts, a child molester cannot 
masturbate in a van near a school. 
To sum up the cases in chronological order, Wiggs reasons 
that a probationer must be model citizen, above and beyond the 
behavior of the average Rhode Islander.138  Forbes gives a 
probationer more leeway, allowing a defendant to get in some hot 
water but escape revocation if the bad behavior is relatively 
minor.139  McCarthy seems to cabin probation violations to actual 
criminal conduct and violations of specific probation conditions.140  
Pitts, on the other hand, allows bad conduct that may not be a 
crime or in contravention of a specifically-stated condition (other 
than an implied condition) to form the basis for a violation.141 
The problematic theme from these decisions is that “good 
behavior” and “keeping the peace” are questions of fact decided on 
a case-by-case basis.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court overturns 
a revocation decision only if the lower court acts arbitrarily or 
 
 136.  Id. at 246.  After the probation violation hearing, the Pitts defendant 
was eventually convicted of disorderly conduct for the same conduct.  Id. at 
244 n.7. 
 137.  Id. at 246.  
 138.  State v. Wiggs, 635 A.2d 272, 274 (R.I. 1993). 
 139.  State v. Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007). 
 140.  State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 328 (R.I. 2008). 
 141.  Pitts, 960 A.2d at 246. 
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capriciously in assessing the credibility of witnesses or finding a 
violation.142  This arbitrary and capricious standard applies to the 
lower court’s determination that conduct does not keep the peace 
or comport with good behavior.143  In effect, the low standard of 
review facilitates a legal system with no precise legal definition to 
the terms “keeping the peace” or “good behavior.”  The lower 
courts have free rein to interpret them as they see fit under the 
umbrella of deciding factual questions.  This treatment of keeping 
the peace and good behavior as factual questions effectively stunts 
development of the law because there is no meaningful review of 
what the terms mean. 
Equally problematic, because there is no precise definition, is 
what constitutes good behavior and the identity of the “right” and 
“wrong” people to associate with because it depends on the 
perspective of the judge at the violation hearing.  This opens up 
the system to criticism about different lifestyles and cultures.  
There is no right to a jury trial in a probation violation proceeding, 
and therefore a jury of one’s peers does not make the factual 
finding on what constitutes “good behavior” or “keeping the 
peace.”144  The finding is made by the court, and the “right” people 
from the perspective of a judge may not be the “right” people from 
the vantage point of a nineteen year-old single mother living in 
poverty.  In effect, the lack of definition to good behavior and 
keeping the peace leads to moral judgments by the judge dressed 
up as findings of fact.  The end result is a judicial decision about 
what is morally “good” or “bad” that is virtually unassailable on 
appeal because it is couched as a question of fact, coupled with the 
potential of significant jail time for the probation violation. 
The line between questions of fact and questions of law can be 
difficult to draw.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court hews the line 
towards questions of fact in probation violation proceedings.  
Another possible approach is to distinguish between (a) findings 
on the conduct that form the basis for the alleged violation, which 
are clearly findings of fact; and (b) findings on whether the 
conduct amounts to a violation of good behavior and keeping the 
 
 142.  See, e.g., id. at 244. 
 143.  See State v. Salvail, 362 A.2d 135, 137 n.3 (R.I. 1976) (describing 
finding a probation violation as a finding of fact). 
 144.  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); United States v. 
Czajak, 909 F.2d 20, 23–24 (1st Cir. 1990). 
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peace, which could be construed as a question of law and therefore 
subject to de novo review.145  To illustrate, whether a defendant 
drove by his counselor’s house is a question of fact, but whether 
the drive-by constitutes a breach of good behavior or keeping the 
peace could be a question of law.  This is the approach that federal 
courts take, for example, when deciding cases on warrantless 
searches.  Like good behavior and keeping the peace, 
reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context is an 
amorphous concept.146  The lower court’s findings on what 
happened are questions of fact entitled to deference, but whether 
those findings amount to a reasonable search or seizure is a 
question of law afforded de novo review.147 
From a defendant’s perspective, the treatment of good 
behavior and keeping the peace as case-by-case factual 
determinations makes it difficult to have fair notice of what 
constitutes a probation violation.  This is troubling because breach 
of these implied conditions can lead to significant jail time. 
The lack of definiteness also raises constitutional questions.  
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Dane is 
illustrative of the issues that arise from vague or ill-defined 
probation conditions.148  The Dane court held that due process 
generally requires fair warning of conduct that might lead to loss 
of liberty through probation revocation, but it drew a clear line 
between lawful and illegal behavior.149  Advance warning is not 
essential when the probationer commits a crime because “[i]n such 
a case, knowledge of the criminal law is imputed to the 
probationer, as is an understanding that violation of the law will 
lead to the revocation of probation.”150  But for otherwise lawful 
behavior, general and special conditions of probation serve the 
important purpose of giving notice of restricted activities.151  
When there are no allegations of criminal activity, unless the 
 
 145.  A more radical approach would be to do away with implied probation 
conditions altogether and craft more detailed conditions similar to the federal 
system. 
 146.  See, e.g., Hudson v. City of Riviera Beach, 982 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 
1341 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
 147.  See, e.g., United States v. Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 969 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 148.  United States v. Dane, 570 F.2d 840, 843 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 149.  Id. at 843–44. 
 150.  Id. at 844. 
 151.  Id.  
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defendant receives prior fair warning that the alleged acts can 
lead to revocation, Dane holds that a court’s decision to revoke 
probation violates due process and is an abuse of discretion.152  
Applying this logic to Rhode Island, it is questionable whether the 
implied conditions of keeping the peace and good behavior are 
definite enough to constitute prior fair warning. 
Recently, in Johnson v. United States, the United States 
Supreme Court held that a criminal law is unconstitutionally 
vague, and therefore violates due process, when it “fails to give 
ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so 
standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.”153  The 
vagueness doctrine applies “not only to statutes defining elements 
of crimes, but also to statutes fixing sentences.”154  As the United 
State Supreme Court has explained, vague sentencing provisions 
pose constitutional problems when “they do not state with 
sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal 
statute.”155  Under federal law, there are three manifestations of 
this fair warning requirement: 
First, the vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of “a 
statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an 
act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application.”  Second, as a sort of “junior version of the 
vagueness doctrine,” the canon of strict construction of 
criminal statutes, or rule of lenity, ensures fair warning 
by so resolving ambiguity in a criminal statute as to 
apply it only to conduct clearly covered.  Third, although 
clarity at the requisite level may be supplied by judicial 
gloss on an otherwise uncertain statute, due process bars 
courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal 
statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior 
judicial decision has fairly disclosed to be within its 
 
 152.  Id.  
 153.  Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). 
 154.  Id. at 2557. 
 155.  Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United 
States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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scope.156 
In Johnson, the Supreme Court examined a statutory 
provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act that defines a “violent 
felony” as a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”157  This 
language is known as the residual clause of the Act; it subjects a 
criminal defendant with three or more prior convictions for 
“violent felonies” to a minimum prison sentence of fifteen years 
and a maximum term of life if they are subsequently convicted of 
possessing a firearm.158 
Johnson found the residual clause unconstitutionally vague 
for several reasons.  First, the Court observed that the residual 
clause “requires a court to picture the kind of conduct that the 
crime involves in ‘the ordinary case,’ and to judge whether that 
abstraction presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.”159  
Framed as such, Johnson reasoned that a “court’s task goes 
beyond deciding whether the creation of risk is an element of the 
crime,” and even “beyond evaluating the chances that the physical 
acts that make up the crime will injure someone.”160  As an 
example, Johnson explained that breaking and entering does not, 
in and of itself, cause physical injury; rather, risk of injury arises 
after entry into a home when the burglar confronts the 
resident.161  Johnson held that the residual clause runs afoul of 
the vagueness doctrine because it leaves uncertainty about how to 
estimate risk when committing a crime.162  According to Johnson, 
there is no reliable method to determine what an “ordinary case” 
of a crime means, and asked rhetorically: “How does one go about 
deciding what kind of conduct ‘the ordinary case’ of a crime 
involves? ‘A statistical analysis of the state reporter?  A survey?  
Expert evidence?  Google?  Gut instinct?’”163 
 
 156.  Id. at 519 (quoting United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 
(1997)). 
 157.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556–67. 
 158.  Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 159.  Id. at 2557 (quoting James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 
(2007)). 
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id. (quoting United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948, 952 (2009) 
(Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (denying rehearing en banc)). 
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Second, Johnson found the residual clause unconstitutionally 
vague because it left too much uncertainty about how much risk is 
required to qualify as a “violent felony” in the abstract.164  “By 
combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by 
a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the 
crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces 
more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process 
Clause tolerates.”165 
Third, Johnson noted the Supreme Court had already 
attempted to establish a workable standard for the residual clause 
in four prior cases and—according to the Johnson majority—failed 
every time.166  Lower courts also struggled to agree on a standard.  
The Court found the lack of agreement as further evidence of 
vagueness.167 
Finally, Johnson rejected the argument that the residual 
clause is constitutional because some crimes fit within the clause’s 
definition and pose a serious risk of physical injury.  Johnson 
reasoned that the Court’s prior “holdings squarely contradict the 
theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because 
there is some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s 
grasp.”168  If a statue is vague, Johnson holds it is vague in all its 
applications.169 
Johnson’s reasoning raises serious questions about Rhode 
Island’s implied probation conditions of good behavior and keeping 
the peace.170  For starters, similar to Johnson, virtually any 
behavior can subject a Rhode Island defendant to a probation 
violation, and the probationer cannot estimate the risk in advance.  
Also, like in Johnson, the meaning of good behavior and keeping 
the peace is indeterminate because the terms are undefined.  No 
Rhode Island court has said what they mean and there is much 
 
 164.  Id. at 2558. 
 165.  Id.  
 166.  Id. at 2556. 
 167.  Id. at 2556, 2558. 
 168.  Id. at 2561. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court often relies on federal precedent to 
decide due process challenges to penal statutes based on void for vagueness.  
See, e.g., State v. Russell, 890 A.2d 453, 459 (R.I. 2006) (citing City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)); State v. Stierhoff, 879 A.2d 425, 435 (R.I. 
2005) (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
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uncertainty.  As in Johnson, Rhode Island courts have had 
difficulty articulating a consistent standard.  Finally, while the 
commission of a crime falls within the ambit of breach of good 
behavior and keeping the peace, Johnson holds that a criminal 
law is vague even if some behavior clearly falls within its ambit.  
Add it all up, and Johnson suggests that good behavior and 
keeping the peace are unconstitutionally vague. 
The application of Johnson to Rhode Island’s implied 
probation conditions is by no means clear.  Two federal cases 
decided decades before Johnson suggest a “good behavior” 
standard is not unconstitutionally vague, although those cases 
addressed employment law and prisoner conduct.171  More recent 
federal cases decided before Johnson have held that probation 
conditions, where violations turn on phrases such as “deemed to 
be inappropriate by the probation officer,”172 “questioned by a law 
enforcement officer,”173 or “associating with ‘any disruptive 
group,’”174 can be void for vagueness as applied to the specific 
facts of the case. 
Johnson itself was decided under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government.175  
It is an open question whether the same vagueness principles 
would attach to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that is applicable to the States.176  There is some 
authority based on federalism concerns that suggests the 
vagueness doctrines applicable to the federal government through 
the Fifth Amendment might be more stringent than the vagueness 
doctrine applied to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
For example, in Butler v. O’Brien, the First Circuit held that 
federal courts exercising habeas corpus review have no power to 
require state courts to adopt the rule of lenity, which is typically 
 
 171.  See Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 686 (8th Cir. 1967) (prisoner 
good conduct case); Hayes v. City of Wilmington, 451 F. Supp. 696, 713 (D. 
Del. 1978) (due process case based on termination of employment). 
 172.  United States v. Begay, 556 F. App’x 581, 583 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 173.  United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 174.  United States v. Vallejo, 292 F. App’x 660, 662 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting United States v. Soltero, 510 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 175.  See, e.g., Martinez-Rivera v. Ramos, 498 F.3d 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 176.  See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rodriguez, 489 F.3d 48, 54 n.3 (1st 
Cir. 2007); Ramirez-Lluveras v. Pagan-Cruz, 862 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 (D.P.R. 
2012). 
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considered part of the vagueness doctrine.177 
It is also noteworthy that probation violation hearings in 
Rhode Island are considered civil proceedings, raising the specter 
that vagueness doctrines apply with less force to probation 
revocation because it is not criminal.  But this seems unlikely 
because Rhode Island’s probation statute is codified in the 
criminal laws, and a probation violation is based on a previously 
imposed sentence and subjects the defendant to significant prison 
time.  In the federal system, courts have tested probation and 
supervised release conditions against the vagueness doctrine.178  
It stands to reason that Rhode Island courts would do the same. 
Irrespective of these theoretical musings, the vagueness 
concerns in Johnson raise substantial questions about the validity 
of good behavior and keeping the peace as implied probation 
conditions.  Criminal defendants in Rhode Island may not have 
fair notice of all the probation conditions that expose them to 
additional jail time. 
III. THE STANDARD FOR BRINGING A PROBATION VIOLATION CHARGE 
When the defendant commits an act that allegedly breaches a 
probation condition, whether it is a new crime or something else, 
the next step is to charge the defendant with a probation violation.  
The charging process is governed by R.I. Gen. Section 12-19-9 of 
the Rhode Island General Laws and Rule 32(f) of the Superior 
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.179  Section 12-19-9 authorizes 
“the police or the probation authority [to] inform the attorney 
general of the violation, and the attorney general shall cause the 
defendant to appear before the court.”  When the defendant 
appears before the court, section 12-19-9 states that “[t]he court 
may request the division of field services to render a report 
relative to the conduct of the defendant, and, pending receipt of 
the report, may order the defendant held without bail for a period 
 
 177.  663 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 178.  See, e.g., United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Locke, 482 F.3d 764, 768 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 179.  The comparable state district court provisions are section 12-19-14 of 
the Rhode Island General Laws and Rule 32(f) of the District Court Rules of 
Criminal Procedure.  They are mostly the same as to the superior court 
provisions; there is one difference in the charging procedure as noted infra 
Part III.   
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not exceeding ten (10) days.”180  Pursuant to Rule 32(f), prior to 
the revocation hearing, “the State shall furnish the defendant and 
the court with a written statement specifying the grounds upon 
which” the probation revocation is based.181 
The major fly in the ointment with the probation charging 
process is that there is no articulated standard to bring a 
probation violation charge.  Conceptually, whatever the standard 
is, it should be less rigorous than the “reasonably satisfied” 
standard required to find a probation violation.  This type of 
dichotomy is pervasive in criminal law: for a crime, the complaint 
or indictment must satisfy probable cause at the pre-trial phase 
and at trial the charge must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  
In the probation violation context, however, there is no dichotomy 
spelled out in Rhode Island’s procedural rules, statutes or case 
law.  The problem is exacerbated by the lack of clarity about the 
meaning of “reasonably satisfied” discussed in greater detail in 
Part V. 
Morrissey v. Brewer suggests the standard to bring a 
probation violation charge should be “probable cause or reasonable 
ground to believe that the arrested [defendant] has committed 
acts that would constitute a violation of [probation] conditions.”182  
The Rhode Island Attorney General echoed this approach in a 
1996 advisory opinion on the burden of proof for parole revocation 
in advising the Parole Board that a parolee has a right to a 
preliminary hearing, and that the purpose of such hearing is to 
determine if there is probable cause to believe the parolee 
committed a parole violation.183 
Notwithstanding Morrissey and the Attorney General’s 
opinion in the parole violation context, one Rhode Island court has 
stated that the “reasonably satisfied” burden of proof to establish 
a probation violation is a standard lower than probable cause.184  
If this decision is correct, the evidence required in order to bring a 
 
 180.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (West Supp. 2015). 
 181.  R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f). 
 182.  408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972). 
 183.  Office of the Att’y Gen. of R.I., Unofficial Op. U96-05, 1996 WL 
33164516, at *1 (Aug. 15, 1996). 
 184.  State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *14 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (“The same way the State does not need to prove a 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need not prove that there 
exists probable cause to determine a finding of violation.”). 
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probation violation charge is virtually nothing; logically, the 
burden to bring a charge should be lower than the burden to find a 
violation. 
Consider that preponderance of the evidence means “more 
likely than not” and requires only 51% certainty.185  Probable 
cause is a lower hurdle than preponderance; it is “something less” 
than 51% certainty, but more than a bare suspicion.186  Probable 
cause exists when there is a fair probability that the defendant 
has committed the offense charged based on the totality of the 
circumstances.187  As the Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
observed, noting a “wry observation” by Sol Wachtler, former 
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, any good 
prosecutor “can get a grand jury to ‘indict a ham sandwich’” based 
on probable cause.188  If, as the Rhode Island court held, the 
“reasonably satisfied” standard to find a probation violation 
means less than probable cause, then the standard for bringing a 
probation violation charge must be even lower than that.  Forget 
the ham sandwich: on a probation violation, any good prosecutor 
could bring a charge against broccoli, particularly if Congress 
required everyone to eat it.189 
Whatever the standard might be for bringing a probation 
violation charge in Rhode Island, it appears to be extremely low.  
Perhaps it is reasonable suspicion, like that employed in a Fourth 
Amendment Terry stop, which “requires there be both a 
particularized and an objective basis for suspecting the individual 
stopped of criminal activity.”190 Or maybe it is substantial 
evidence, like that used in the administrative law context, defined 
as “more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a 
suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established.  It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
 
 185.  See Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 627 F.2d 416, 453 n.139 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Melvin, 596 F.2d 492, 495 (1st Cir. 1979). 
 186.  United States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 636 (7th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 352–53 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 187.  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983); United States v. 
Gomez, 716 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 188.  State v. Russell, 950 A.2d 418, 420 n.1 (R.I. 2008).  
 189.  Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 
(2012) (sparring between justices over the limits of the Commerce Clause and 
eating broccoli). 
 190.  United States v. Dapolito, 713 F.3d 141, 148 (1st Cir. 2013). 
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adequate to support a conclusion.”191  Whatever the standard is, it 
is concerning that a probation violation charge exposes a 
defendant to significant loss of liberty, but the standard for 
bringing that charge is unclear and unknown. 
Another significant issue is that the charging procedure 
resides solely within the executive branch and is unchecked by the 
judiciary.  In superior court, pursuant to section 12-19-9 of the 
Rhode Island General Laws, the Attorney General makes the 
decision to bring the violation charge along with the police or 
probation office, and the Attorney General “cause[s] the defendant 
to appear before the court.”  In state district court, under section 
12-19-14 of the Rhode Island General Laws, the Attorney General 
has no role at all under the letter of the statute; it is the “police or 
division of field services [that] cause[s] the defendant to appear 
before the court.”192 
The state procedure is in marked contrast to the federal 
system where the judiciary plays a significant role in issuing the 
probation charge.  In federal court, a probation officer drafts a 
violation report and presents it to a district judge for review.  The 
reviewing judge is normally the same judge that originally 
sentenced the defendant and is familiar with the case.  The notice 
of violation is not issued, thereby causing the defendant to be 
brought before the court, until the district judge finds probable 
cause that a violation has occurred and signs the probation 
violation report that authorizes the summons.193  Under federal 
law, “it is the court and the court alone that ultimately decides 
 
 191.  R & B Transp., LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 618 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 
2010) (quoting BSP Trans Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 160 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 192.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-14 (2006).  The state district court practice 
raises a host of issues associated with police officers and the unauthorized 
practice of law that are beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Andrew 
Horwitz & John R. Grasso, Police Prosecution in Rhode Island: The 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, R.I.B.J., May/June 2006, at 5–6; Andrew 
Horwitz, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Law and the Reality in 
Rhode Island District Court, 9 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 409, 421 (2004); 
Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop Out of Copping A Plea: Eradicating Police 
Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1998); see also 
Nikolas Frye, Note, Allowing New Hampshire Police Officers to Prosecute: 
Concerns with the Practice and a Solution, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 339, 340 (2012). 
 193.  See generally 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562 (4th ed. 2015). 
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whether or not revocation proceedings shall be initiated and, if 
initiated, what consequences will befall the individual who has 
violated his conditions of release.”194  As such, the federal court 
provides an important check on the violation-charging decision.  
The judge reviewing the probation violation report has the 
discretion to not authorize a summons even if probable cause 
exists that a violation occurred.  This is different from Rhode 
Island’s system, which does not provide for the judiciary to check 
at all on the charging decision. 
The difference between the state and federal systems can be 
largely explained on where the probation department fits within 
the structure of the respective governments.  In the state system, 
the probation department is part of the executive branch.195  In 
the federal system, probation is part of the judicial branch.196  A 
federal probation officer is not working for the prosecution at the 
charging decision-stage, but, rather is assisting the court in its 
supervision of the defendant—“an integral part of the courts’ 
quintessentially judicial sentencing responsibility.”197 
Structurally, it is problematic in Rhode Island’s system that a 
probation officer is working solely for the prosecution.  Checks and 
balances are lessened when the prosecutor and probation are 
working for the same branch of government,198 and the structure 
gives the executive branch more bargaining power when the 
probation charge is coupled with allegations of a new crime.  If the 
Attorney General can file a probation violation charge without any 
judicial review whatsoever, the mere existence of the probation 
 
 194.  United States v. Bermudez-Plaza, 221 F.3d 231, 234 (1st Cir. 2000). 
 195.  The state probation office, technically known by statute as the 
division of rehabilitative services, is part of the state department of 
corrections.  R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-56-2, 42-56-7 (2006).  It is also worth noting 
that the Attorney General in Rhode Island is elected and has a unique 
constitutional role.  See In re House of Representatives, 575 A.2d 176, 179 
(R.I. 1990).  For present purposes what matters is that the power and 
discretion to prosecute crimes is a “fundamental executive power” and both 
the probation department and the attorney general are part of the executive 
branch.  In re McKenna, 110 A.3d 1126, 1140 (R.I. 2015); see R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§§ 42-56-2, -7; see also Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1055 (R.I. 2004) 
(describing attorney general as an executive branch official). 
 196.  18 U.S.C. § 3602(a) (2012). 
 197.  Bermudez-Plaza, 221 F.3d at 234. 
 198.  See Andrew R. Klein, When Should We Revoke Parole?, JUDGES’ J., 
Winter 1988, at 2, 38. 
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charge—and all the lesser procedural protections that come with 
it, including a lower burden of proof and lack of jury trial 
combined with the substantial threat of jail time—make it more 
likely the defendant will agree to a plea deal regardless of the 
merits of the case. 
 
IV. BAIL FOR ALLEGED PROBATION VIOLATORS AND THE LACK OF A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING 
When a Rhode Island defendant is charged with a probation 
violation, the defendant is either arrested or served a summons to 
appear in court at a specific date and time.  The summons is sent 
to the defendant’s last known address by regular mail; if the 
defendant does not appear in court, a bench warrant is issued and 
the defendant is arrested. 
The First Circuit and Rhode Island courts have held that an 
alleged probation violator does not have a constitutional right to 
bail.199  Pursuant to section 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws, a defendant facing a probation violation charge may be 
“held without bail for a period not exceeding ten (10) days, 
excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays.”  Similarly, Rule 
32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure states 
simply that “[t]he defendant may be admitted to bail pending [the 
probation violation] hearing.”200  Rhode Island’s Bail Guidelines 
are silent as to bail conditions for alleged probation violators. The 
Rhode Island Bail Guidelines do, however, specify that money or 
surety bail is required as a minimum for defendants on probation 
who are also charged with a new crime.201 
In Rhode Island, the bail decision is especially significant 
when the defendant is facing new criminal charges in addition to a 
probation violation.  A defendant charged with a new crime is 
ordinarily released on bail.  But a probation violator charged with 
a new crime is detained in virtually all cases.  Thus, if the 
probationer does not admit to the probation violation and new 
 
 199.  See State v. Osei, No. P1-2001-1557A, 2013 WL 1852948, at *4 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2013) (citing In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir. 
1970)).   
 200.  The state district court rules are the same.  See R.I. DIST. CT. R. 
CRIM. P. 32(f); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-14 (2006). 
 201.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. BAIL GUIDELINES § II.4.c. 
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criminal charge at the outset, there is a strong likelihood that the 
defendant will be detained.  This creates a strong fulcrum for the 
defendant to plead guilty to the probation violation and the new 
criminal charge.  Lurking in the background is the reality that the 
detention, pending the probation violation hearing, usually lasts 
longer than the ten business day limit specified in section 12-19-9 
of the Rhode Island General Laws. In practice, ten business 
days—two full calendar weeks—is typically the minimum amount 
of time a defendant is held before the violation hearing, not the 
maximum amount of time. 
Article I, section 9 of the Rhode Island Constitution governs 
the right to bail for pre-trial defendants facing new charges unless 
the crime either carries a potential punishment of life in prison, 
involves dangerous weapons when the defendant has already been 
convicted of a crime that carries a maximum sentence of life 
imprisonment, or in certain drug offenses, when the maximum 
sentence is greater than ten years.  These offenses are colloquially 
known as capital offenses and drug distribution crimes.  For these 
pre-trial defendants, although they “do not have a constitutional 
right to bail, they do have a constitutional right to have their bail 
determined in accordance with the due process clause.”202  In all 
other cases, a defendant facing a new criminal charge has a 
constitutional right to bail.  Bail terms are set pursuant to Rule 
46(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 
requires the court to set terms that: 
[W]ill insure the presence of the defendant, having regard 
to the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 
the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the 
financial ability of the defendant to give bail, the 
character of the defendant, and the policy against 
unnecessary detention of defendants pending trial.203 
Defendants found guilty who are awaiting sentencing may be 
granted bail or committed.204  Similarly, defendants adjudged 
 
 202.  Witt v. Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 264 (R.I. 1990). 
 203.  The standard is the same for pre-trial defendants in state district 
court.  See R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). 
 204.  See, e.g., State v. Briguglio, 661 A.2d 525, 525 (R.I. 1995) (per 
curiam) (releasing defendant on bail pending sentencing); State v. Thomas, 
No. K1-94-0149A, 1999 WL 360752, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 1999) 
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guilty but who challenge their conviction do not have an automatic 
right to bail.  Bail, pending appeal, is committed to the court’s 
sound discretion.205 Factors considered by the court include: 
(1) whether the appeal is taken for delay or in good faith 
on grounds not frivolous but fairly debatable; (2) the 
habits of the individual regarding respect for the law 
insofar as they are relevant on the question of whether an 
applicant’s release would pose a threat to the community; 
(3) local attachments to the community by way of family 
ties, business or investment; (4) the severity of the 
sentence imposed, and circumstances relevant to the 
question of whether a defendant would remove himself 
from the jurisdiction of the court.206 
Harmonizing these rules, in the Rhode Island system, the 
only criminal defendants facing new charges who do not have an 
automatic right to bail (other than defendants already on bail) are 
those charged with capital crimes, certain drug distribution 
offenses—and probation (or deferred sentence) violators.  Unlike 
the first two categories on this list, a probation violator could be 
detained for non-criminal conduct such as failure to attend a 
counseling session, or for a misdemeanor crime such as disorderly 
conduct that would ordinarily result in bail. 
Bail for alleged probation violators exists in a kind of 
netherworld.  A probationer with a violation charge has one foot in 
the post-conviction world because he or she is already convicted, 
and another foot in the pre-trial world because the probationer 
has no pending charges at the time the alleged violation occurs.  
But, unlike the rules for pre-trial defendants and convicted 
defendants who are appealing their convictions, there are no clear 
standards governing bail for alleged probation violators.  Rule 
 
(holding defendant without bail pending sentencing).  In the federal system: 
[T]he judicial officer shall order that a person who has been found 
guilty of an offense and who is awaiting imposition or execution of 
sentence . . . be detained, unless the judicial officer finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a 
danger to the safety of any other person or the community if 
released.   
18 U.S.C. § 3143(a) (2012). 
 205.  State v. Feng, 421 A.2d 1258, 1263 (R.I. 1980). 
 206.  State v. Abbott, 322 A.2d 33, 35 (1974). 
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32(f) says “[t]he defendant may be admitted to bail pending [the 
probation violation] hearing,” but there is nothing else that fleshes 
out the rule.  The superior court has explained that “[u]nder the 
commonly accepted view, the amount of bail set pending 
[probation] violation hearings is thus clearly subject to a relaxed 
standard” because “[t]here is no presumption of innocence in the 
probation revocation process, at least not in the sense in which the 
phrase is used with reference to the criminal process.”207  This is 
as far as Rhode Island courts have gone—there is no guidance on 
what the “relaxed standard” should be, or how bail should be 
decided.  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has suggested an 
alleged probation violator can be held for ten days pursuant to 
section 12-19-9 of Rhode Island’s General Laws without any 
inquiry at all into whether bail is appropriate.208  Probation 
revocation hearings are considered “civil proceeding[s],”209 which 
as a general matter should mean the stakes are lower.  Ironically, 
defendants are typically detained in a “civil” probation proceeding, 
while the same defendant would usually be released on bail in a 
criminal proceeding for the same conduct. 
The rules for bail in the federal system for probation and 
supervised release are more clearly defined.  The standard for 
release on bail in the federal system is high: the defendant must 
show by clear and convincing evidence that he will not flee or pose 
a danger to any person or to the community.210  In practice, 
federal defendants who face revocation for technical violations are 
frequently granted bail.  If a new crime is the basis for the 
violation, a federal defendant is usually detained pending the final 
revocation hearing.  This is not as onerous as it sounds.  New 
criminal charges are usually resolved before a violation proceeding 
goes forward in the federal system.  It is not heavy lifting for the 
court to find risk of flight or danger to the community when the 
 
 207.  State v. Osei, No. P1-2001-1557A, 2013 WL 1852948, at *4 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting In re 
Whitney, 421 F.2d 337, 338 (1st Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 208.  State v. Lawrence, 658 A.2d 890, 893 (R.I. 1995) (“[W]e are of the 
opinion that § 12-19-9 is quite clear in mandating that a defendant may be 
held without bail pending a probation-revocation hearings ‘for a period not 
exceeding ten (10) days.’”). 
 209.   State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I. 2009). 
 210.   FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(a)(6). 
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new crime that is the basis for the violation has already been 
adjudicated. 
Another important distinction from the state system is that 
federal defendants in custody have the right to challenge the 
violation at a preliminary hearing; if no probable cause exists, the 
defendant must be released.211  Pursuant to Rule 32.1(b)(1) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a federal magistrate judge 
must promptly conduct the preliminary hearing and the defendant 
has the right to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.212  
Significantly, this rule applies only when the defendant is held in 
custody based on allegations of violation of probation or 
supervised release.213  If the defendant is not in custody, federal 
courts hold there is no right to a preliminary hearing because a 
loss of liberty does not arise until the defendant is taken into 
custody.214  “The point of [Rule 32.1] is to prevent people from 
being held indefinitely on mere allegations of supervised release 
[or probation] violations.”215  Stated another way, there is no 
liberty interest at stake if the federal defendant is not taken into 
custody, and therefore, no due process right to a preliminary 
hearing.216 
At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, “[i]f the judge 
finds probable cause, the judge must conduct a revocation hearing.  
If the judge does not find probable cause, the judge must dismiss 
the proceeding.”217  Some federal courts have gone so far as to 
 
 211.   See also United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 212.   FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b). 
 213.   United States v. Scott, 182 F.3d 902, 1999 WL 464993, at *2 (2d Cir. 
1999) (unpublished table decision).   
 214.   United States v. Pippin, 613 Fed. App’x 476, 479 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Scott, 182 F.3d 902, 1999 WL 464993, at *2. 
 215.   Scott, 182 F.3d 902, 1999 WL 464993, at *2; cf. United States v. 
Chaklader, 987 F.2d 75, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (“[T]here is ‘no constitutional duty 
to provide petitioner an adversary parole hearing until he is taken into 
custody as a parole violator.’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Moody v. Daggett, 
429 U.S. 78, 89 (1976))). 
 216.   Cf. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011) (stating that due 
process requires a liberty interest). 
 217.   FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(C).  The First Circuit, in a short footnote, 
has stated that a no probable cause finding by a magistrate judge at a 
preliminary hearing does not bind a district judge at a subsequent revocation 
hearing.  The preliminary hearing is available to those defendants held in 
custody and does not constrain a district judge’s factual findings at the 
revocation hearing.  See Vixamar, 679 F.3d at 26 n.2 (citing 3 CHARLES ALAN 
BALDWIN & THOMPSON FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  11:37 PM 
2016] THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES 287 
equate the protections in Rule 32.1 as synonymous with 
constitutional due process.218 
By contrast, the Rhode Island probation violation procedure 
has no mechanism to challenge the probation charge at a 
preliminary hearing.  Instead, the defendant appears at a 
presentment, which is akin to an arraignment.  The defendant can 
argue for bail at the presentment, but it is not an evidentiary 
hearing.  After that, the charge proceeds directly to the probation 
violation hearing.219 
In State v. DeLomba, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held 
there is no right to a preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for a probation violation.220  Under DeLomba, the defendant 
is only entitled to one hearing at which it is “determine[d] whether 
[the defendant] is, in fact, a violator and, if so, what his 
punishment should be.”221  Citing Goldberg v. Kelly, a United 
States Supreme Court case, DeLomba held that “due process does 
not, of course, require two hearings,” reasoning that “no 
constitutional purpose would be served by bifurcating our present 
unitary judicial violation hearing, at which an alleged violator is 
afforded due process rights equal or superior to those required” by 
federal precedent.222  DeLomba also declined to adopt a dual 
hearing requirement on public policy grounds.223  After DeLomba, 
Rhode Island courts have routinely relied on it for the proposition 
that criminal defendants have no right to a preliminary hearing to 
 
WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562, at 
379 (4th ed. 2011)). 
 218.  United States v. Destefano, 178 Fed. App’x 613, 615 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(“[D]ue process requires that a probationer who is in custody for an alleged 
probation violation be afforded a prompt ‘preliminary hearing to determine 
whether probable cause exists to believe that a probation violation has 
occurred.’” (quoting United States v. Sutton, 607 F.2d 220, 222 (8th Cir. 
1979))). 
 219.   R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006).  The court can request the 
probation department to produce a report on the violation for the final 
revocation hearing while the defendant is detained.  Id.; see also R.I. R. CRIM. 
P. 32(f) (requiring that prior to the revocation hearing, the State must 
provide the defendant and the court with a written statement specifying the 
grounds for the probation violation). 
 220.   State v. DeLomba, 370 A.2d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1977). 
 221.   Id. at 1275. 
 222.   Id. at 1275, 1276 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 n.14 
(1970)). 
 223.   Id. at 1276.  
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determine probable cause on a probation violation followed by a 
final revocation hearing.224 
DeLomba is problematic.  Structurally, the federal system 
provides for a probable cause determination when the court issues 
a summons on a violation.  If the federal defendant is held in 
custody, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing to 
challenge probable cause, followed by another assessment of the 
evidence at the revocation hearing.  Thus, a federal judge 
potentially passes on the merits of the charges against a 
defendant three times (summons, preliminary hearing, and 
violation hearing).  By contrast, in the state system under 
DeLomba, the court passes on merits of the violation just once—at 
the probation violating hearing. 
DeLomba’s reasoning is suspect for several reasons.  First, 
DeLomba has a blind spot for probation violation cases without a 
related criminal charge.  The defendant in DeLomba asked for the 
final revocation hearing to be delayed until after criminal charges 
based on the same conduct as the probation violation were 
resolved.  DeLomba rejected this approach, reasoning that if the 
final revocation hearing is delayed until after the criminal 
proceeding, the defendant will receive more due process than 
required for probation violators.225  The problem with this logic is 
that it presupposes there is a criminal charge based on the same 
conduct.  If there is no companion criminal charge, the defendants’ 
due process rights rise and fall on the procedure afforded by the 
probation violation hearing. 
DeLomba also reasons that Rhode Island’s “unitary judicial 
violation hearing” procedure affords rights equal or superior to 
those required by Gagnon226 and that a preliminary hearing is not 
required because “[n]either the federal nor our own state 
constitution requires empty ceremonies.”227  This holding is hard 
to square with the plain language of Gagnon, which reads: 
Even though the revocation of parole is not a part of the 
criminal prosecution, we held [in Morrissey] that the loss 
 
 224.   See, e.g., State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1155 (R.I. 2003); State v. 
DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1231 n.1 (R.I. 1978); State v. Almeida, No. C.A. 
P1/94-1686A, 1998 WL 960806, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1998). 
 225.   DeLomba, 370 A.2d at 1276. 
 226.   Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 617, 782 (1973). 
 227.   DeLomba, 370 A.2d at 1276. 
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of liberty entailed is a serious deprivation requiring that 
the parolee be accorded due process.  Specifically, we held 
that a parolee is entitled to two hearings, one a 
preliminary hearing at the time of his arrest and 
detention to determine whether there is probable cause to 
believe that he has committed a violation of his parole, 
and the other a somewhat more comprehensive hearing 
prior to the making of the final revocation decision. . . . 
Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage 
of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of 
liberty.  Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a 
parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation 
hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v. 
Brewer.228 
DeLomba distinguishes this holding on the theory that a final 
probation revocation hearing in Rhode Island has all the 
procedural protections of what a defendant would receive at a 
preliminary hearing, so no harm, no foul.229  The problem with 
this rationale is it goes against the entire purpose for early review 
of criminal proceedings.  After all, criminal defendants receive 
more due process at a criminal trial than in front of grand juries; 
under DeLomba’s logic, there is no need for a grand jury because it 
is an “empty ceremon[y].”230  The whole point of preliminary 
criminal reviews—whether in the form of a grand jury, warrant 
authorizations, or probable cause hearings—is to provide a check 
on prosecutorial power.  Perhaps one could rationalize that a 
probation violation hearing is technically not a stage of a criminal 
prosecution, and therefore there is no need to provide a check 
against the executive.  Given that a probation violation often 
subjects the criminal defendant to more jail time than a newly-
charged crime based on the same conduct,231 this is a weak 
justification. 
 
 228.   Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 781–82 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
 229.  See DeLomba, 370 A.2d at 1276. 
 230.  See id. 
 231.  See, e.g., State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242 (R.I. 2008) (affirming 
sentence to five years for probation violation).  The defendant’s conduct in 
Pitts formed a basis for a disorderly conduct charge, a petty misdemeanor 
that carries a maximum sentence of six months.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-
1(c) (2006); State v. Hesford, 900 A.2d 1194, 1198 (R.I. 2006). 
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DeLomba’s reliance on a unitary revocation hearing procedure 
ignores the reality that serious consequences flow from the 
probation charging decision.  When a probation violation is 
coupled with a new criminal charge, detention on the probation 
violation creates a strong hammer for the defendant to plead to 
the new criminal charge and admit the violation in a package 
deal.  The hammer is all the stronger because Rhode Island’s 
probation system provides no method to challenge detention for a 
probation violation based on lack of probable cause. 
Finally, DeLomba over-reads the United States Supreme 
Court’s quote in Goldberg v. Kelly that “[due] process does not, of 
course, require two hearings.”232  Goldberg addressed whether the 
Due Process Clause requires an evidentiary hearing before 
termination of public assistance benefits.233  Under the state-law 
benefits scheme before the Goldberg Court, the challenged 
administrative process entitled the beneficiary to a “fair hearing” 
with full administrative review only after the termination of 
benefits.234  Goldberg held that a person is entitled to an initial 
determination before public assistance is terminated to protect 
against error because of the importance of benefits to the 
beneficiary’s livelihood.235 
Goldberg does state that “due process does not, of course, 
require two hearings,” but the decision makes clear that it is not 
the categorical rule that DeLomba makes it out to be.236  The next 
sentence in Goldberg qualifies the rule—two hearings are not 
required “[i]f, for example, a State simply wishes to continue 
benefits until after a ‘fair’ hearing there will be no need for a 
preliminary hearing.”237  In other words, Goldberg says only one 
hearing is necessary if a State decides to continue paying benefits 
until after a full administrative hearing.238  This analogy is inapt 
to the probation revocation context, where a defendant is usually 
subject to arrest and detention based solely on the allegation of a 
 
 232.  DeLomba, 370 A.2d at 1275, 1276 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 n.14 (1969)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 233.  See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256. 
 234.  See id. at 266–67. 
 235.  See id. at 267. 
 236.  See id. at 267 n.14. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See id. 
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probation violation.  The beneficiary in Goldberg was not subject 
to immediate arrest if the State notified him that his benefits 
could be terminated after a full evidentiary hearing.  Unlike 
Goldberg, where there would be no immediate consequence from a 
notice that benefits might be terminated in the future, a 
probationer suffers immediate harm.239 
DeLomba may also interpret that Goldberg denies the need 
for a preliminary hearing, since a probation revocation does not 
occur until after the full revocation hearing.  The problem with 
this logic is it ignores the reasoning in Morrissey, which set the 
minimum due process required for parole revocation hearings,240 
and Gagnon, which extended to probation revocation.241  
Morrissey held that due process requires a minimal preliminary 
inquiry conducted promptly while information is fresh and sources 
are available because there is often a time lag between the time of 
arrest and the final determination by the parole board.242  
Morrissey explained that the preliminary hearing should be “to 
determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground 
to believe that the arrested [defendant] has committed acts that 
would constitute a violation of . . . conditions.”243  Notably, the 
Rhode Island Attorney General concurred with Morrissey’s 
reasoning in a 1996 Advisory Opinion, informing the State Parole 
Board that due process requires a preliminary hearing for parole 
revocations.244 
Analytically, the import of DeLomba as measured against 
federal law can be split into two different scenarios: first, when 
the probationer is charged with a violation but not a crime, and 
second, when the probation violator is also charged with a crime 
based on the same conduct.  In the first scenario, when a 
probationer faces only a violation, DeLomba could be rationalized 
as consistent with Morrissey as long as the alleged violator is not 
held without bail.  This is because the defendant does not face a 
significant deprivation of a liberty interest if not held in custody 
 
 239.  See id. at 267–68. 
 240.  See Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972). 
 241.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1972). 
 242.  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. 
 243.  Id.  
 244.  See Office of the Att’y Gen. of R.I., Unofficial Op. U96-05, 1996 WL 
33164516, at *1 (Aug. 15, 1996). 
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pending the violation hearing.  In Rhode Island, this fact pattern 
plays out only sometimes—technical violators are regularly held 
without bail pending the violation hearing.  When defendants are 
detained, the reasoning in Morrissey and Goldberg requires a 
preliminary hearing because the defendant is in custody and no 
neutral decision-maker has determined the probation charge has 
merit.  Thus, for probationers charged with violations but not 
crimes, the key determining factor is the bail decision: if the 
probationer is held in custody, he or she should receive a 
preliminary hearing; if not in custody, no preliminary hearing is 
required. 
The second scenario, when a probationer is also charged with 
a crime based on the same conduct, requires a more nuanced 
analysis.  In this instance, a court (or grand jury) has already 
made an initial ex parte determination that probable cause exists 
either by authorizing a warrant, reviewing a criminal complaint or 
indictment, or otherwise assessing evidence for a new crime.  
Under this scenario, unlike the violation-only situation, a neutral 
decision-maker has determined that probable cause exists for the 
newly charged crime—which is based on the same conduct as the 
violation charge.  The concern in Morrissey that a minimal inquiry 
be conducted at or near the time of the alleged violation might 
arguably be satisfied by this ex parte determination, although the 
accused probationer is still detained without the immediate 
opportunity to challenge probable cause.245 
Nevertheless, when the defendant is detained, significant 
constitutional problems can arise under the second scenario with 
the bundling of the probation charge and the new crime.  If a 
probation revocation hearing happens quickly after the notice of 
violation, DeLomba could be consistent with Morrissey to the 
extent there is no concern of stale evidence because a court (or 
grand jury) has already made an initial ex parte determination—
in Morrissey parlance, a “minimal inquiry”—that probable cause 
exists.246  This may be possible in theory, as Rhode Island permits 
the court to hold an alleged probation violator without bail for 
only ten business days, but in practice most probation revocation 
hearings, if they go forward at all, occur well after the alleged 
 
 245.  See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. 
 246.  Id. 
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conduct.247  A cursory review of recent probation violation 
decisions bears this out.  For example, in Prout, the alleged 
conduct occurred in June 2012 and the probation violation hearing 
happened in February 2013;248 in State v. McKinnon-Conneally, 
the arrest was in December 2011 and the probation violation 
hearing in February 2012;249 and, in Barrientos, the arrest 
occurred in January 2011 and the probation violation hearing 
went forward in June 2011.250  In McCarthy, where no new 
criminal charges were pending, the defendant was arrested on the 
probation violation in February 2005 and the hearing did not 
occur until June 2005.251 
As these cases illustrate, hearings often happen later than ten 
business days after the incident that gave rise to the notice of a 
violation.  Morrissey found that a lapse of two months between the 
time of arrest for a parole violation and the final revocation is not 
unreasonable, but even for such a short gap, it still held that 
defendants are entitled to a preliminary and final revocation 
hearing.252  This suggests that even short gaps between the time 
of the underlying conduct and the final revocation hearing should 
require a preliminary hearing, and that preliminary hearings 
should definitely be required when the gap is two months.  
Evidence was not fresh within the meaning of Morrissey, as seen 
in Prout when there was a seven-month gap between the arrest 
and the probation violation hearing.253  There are multitudes of 
reasons for delays—the defendant might want counsel or more 
time to marshal a defense, or perhaps there are plea negotiations.  
But whatever the reason, given the reality that many probation 
violation hearings do not happen quickly, the due process right to 
a preliminary hearing should not ride on the uncertainty of when 
a final revocation hearing will occur.  When the probationer is 
detained, this uncertainty should militate towards holding a 
preliminary hearing even if the defendant is also charged with a 
crime based on the same conduct.  This is because under 
 
 247.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006). 
 248.  See State v. Prout, 116 A.3d 196, 198 (R.I. 2015). 
 249.  See 101 A.3d 875, 877 (R.I. 2014). 
 250.  See State v. Barrientos, 88 A.3d 1130, 1132 (R.I. 2014). 
 251.  See State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 320 (R.I. 2008). 
 252.  See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). 
 253.  See Prout, 116 A.3d at 198. 
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Morrissey, due process requires a minimal inquiry “as promptly as 
convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are 
available” to allow a defendant to challenge the evidence against 
him.254  Gagnon echoes Morrissey’s rule, holding that the 
preliminary hearing should be held “at the time of . . . arrest and 
detention.”255 
One of the benefits of a preliminary hearing is that it gives an 
accused the opportunity to challenge the State’s evidence without 
subjecting oneself to major consequences if the challenge fails.  
Morrissey and Gagnon envision a preliminary hearing to 
determine whether probable cause exists for the violation, in 
which the consequence of a finding for the State at the 
preliminary hearing is merely continued prosecution of the 
violation and perhaps continued detention.256  This mirrors a 
preliminary or probable cause hearing in a normal criminal 
setting where the defendant has a chance to challenge probable 
cause, with the worst consequence being continued prosecution.  
But, in Rhode Island’s probation violation system, there is no 
avenue for the defendant to challenge probable cause or test the 
evidence in any preliminary way.  The probationer can only 
challenge the evidence at the final violation hearing, where the 
stakes are years in prison rather than simply continued 
prosecution.  As such, the unitary hearing procedure for probation 
violations is another coercive measure that discourages a 
probationer from challenging an alleged violation. 
A potential solution would be to release more alleged 
probation violators, thus negating the need for a preliminary 
hearing regardless of whether the probationer faces only a 
violation or also a new criminal charge.  As noted above, there 
appear to be no substantive standards set forth by statute or case 
law that guide the bail decision in the probation violation context. 
One tempting but ultimately flawed approach to develop bail 
standards for alleged probation violators would be to look to 
Rhode Island’s bail revocation rules for pre-trial defendants.  
Rhode Island courts often analogize between probation violation 
hearings and bail revocation hearings, and probation violation 
 
 254.  Morrissey, 408 U.S.  at 485. 
 255.  Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). 
 256.  See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485. 
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hearings are often combined with bail hearings or bail revocation 
hearings.  Similar to the probation revocation statute that allows 
a defendant to be held for ten days,257 the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court has held that a bail revocation hearing should proceed 
within two weeks of the arrest, and that the same due process 
rights afforded at a probation violation hearing are also required 
at a bail revocation hearing.258  The burden of proof at a probation 
violation hearing is the same at a bail revocation hearing.259  The 
State may also rely on inadmissible evidence in both bail and 
probation revocation hearings.260 
Probation violations and bail revocation have similarities, but 
the purposes of bail and probation are analytically distinct.  The 
purpose of probation is to rehabilitate,261 and the purpose of 
probation revocation is to punish the defendant for abusing the 
court’s act of grace and grant of conditional liberty.262  By 
contrast, the purpose of bail is not to rehabilitate or punish.  
Rather, “[t]he primary purpose of bail, be it of the pre-trial or the 
post-conviction variety, is to assure a defendant’s appearance in 
court at the appointed time.”263  The Rhode Island Supreme Court 
has said that the “bail system is designed to ensure the accused’s 
presence at court and to keep the accused as much under the 
control of the court as if he were actually in the custody of a court 
officer.”264  In addition, it is “constitutionally permissible to hold a 
defendant without bail in order to prevent danger to the 
community.”265  The twin purposes of risk of flight and danger to 
the community mirror the Federal Bail Reform Act.266 
While the purposes of probation revocation and bail are 
different, functionally Rhode Island law treats them the same.  
This is made clear from Rhode Island’s bail guidelines, which 
 
 257.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006). 
 258.  See Mello v. Superior Court, 370 A.2d 1262, 1266 (R.I. 1977). 
 259.  See id. 
 260.  Bridges v. Superior Court, 396 A.2d 97, 99 (R.I. 1978). 
 261.  Tillinghast v. Howard, 287 A.2d 749, 752 (R.I. 1972); see The Costs of 
Abusing Probationary Sentences, supra note 83, at 757–58, 761, 762. 
 262.  State v. Gobern, 423 A.2d 1177, 1179 (R.I. 1981); Tillinghast, 287 
A.2d at 751–52.   
 263.  State v. Abbott, 322 A.2d 33, 35 (R.I. 1974). 
 264.  Bridges, 396 A.2d at 101. 
 265.  Witt v. Moran, 572 A.2d 261, 265 (R.I. 1990). 
 266.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2012). 
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state that the “[t]he purpose of bail is to assure that the defendant 
will appear in court as required and will keep the peace and be of 
good behavior.”267  Under Rhode Island law, keeping the peace 
and good behavior are conditions both of bail268 and probation.269 
The current practice of conflating the standards for probation 
violations and bail revocation leads to troubling results.  As a 
practical matter, Rhode Island law treats a probationer as subject 
to the threat of bail revocation at any time during the entire span 
of the probationary sentence.  Probation is revoked for failing to 
keep the peace and maintain good behavior, and bail is revoked 
for failing to keep the peace and maintain good behavior.  When a 
defendant is detained and denied bail for a probation charge at 
the initial court appearance pending the probation violation 
hearing, the decision not to grant bail is in essence a decision to 
revoke the defendant’s bail.  This means the court appears to be 
finding that the defendant failed to keep the peace or exhibit good 
behavior before the probation revocation hearing has even begun, 
but without reviewing any evidence or other information to 
support such a finding. 
Seen from this perspective, Rhode Island’s bail revocation 
procedures are not necessarily helpful to crafting standards that 
should govern bail for alleged probation violators.  At the initial 
appearance on a probation violation (i.e., the presentment), for the 
purposes of bail, it seems more appropriate to ask whether the 
defendant is a risk of flight or danger to the community than to 
ask whether the person has kept the peace or maintained good 
behavior.  This approach separates the probation violation finding 
from the bail decision.  In practice, this is the standard that some 
courts seem to employ at presentments on probation violations 
when considering bail, but the inquiry is rarely made with any 
vigor.  If taken seriously and treated on an individualized basis, 
asking whether a probationer is a risk of flight or danger to the 
community would make it more likely that a defendant will be 
granted bail pending a probation violation hearing.  This, in turn, 
will relieve some of the tremendous pressure on a probationer to 
admit to a violation in the hope of avoiding additional prison time. 
 
 267.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. BAIL GUIDELINES § I. 
 268.  State v. McKinnon-Conneally, 101 A.3d 875, 877 (R.I. 2014); State v. 
Demers, 525 A.2d 1308, 1309 (R.I. 1987). 
 269.  State v. Waite, 813 A.2d 982, 985 (R.I. 2003). 
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Ironically, probationers in the state district court will often be 
released if they agree to admit to a probation violation and plead 
to a new charge based on the same conduct, but they will be 
detained as a risk of flight or danger to the community if they 
refuse to admit.  This begs the question of how a defendant is a 
bona fide risk of flight or danger to the community when the court 
is willing to release the defendant if they agree to plead guilty. 
V. THE “REASONABLY SATISFIED” STANDARD AT THE REVOCATION 
HEARING 
If the defendant does not plead to the probation charge, the 
main event is the probation revocation hearing.  The procedure for 
the hearing is not enumerated by statute or rule of criminal 
procedure.  Section 12-19-9 of Rhode Island’s General Laws states 
simply that “[t]he court shall conduct a hearing to determine 
whether the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of 
his or her probation, at which hearing the defendant shall have 
the opportunity to be present and to respond.”  Rule 32(f) of the 
Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure says in 
relevant part that at the “hearing . . . the defendant shall be 
afforded the opportunity to be present and apprised of the grounds 
on which such action is proposed.”270  Morrissey and Gagnon 
provide the minimum due process required at probation 
revocation hearings: (a) written notice of the claimed violations; 
(b) disclosure of evidence; (c) opportunity to be heard in person 
and present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) a limited 
right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (e) a 
neutral and detached decision-maker; (f) a written statement of 
the evidence reasons for revoking probation; and (g) the right to 
counsel on a case-by-case basis.271 
Many legal commentators have discussed these requirements 
and the limited due process afforded at probation violation 
hearings.272  Most notably, commentators have expounded on the 
coercive effects of bundling a probation violation with new 
 
 270.  The state district court rules are the same.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
19-14 (2006); R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f). 
 271.  See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781–82 (1973); Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488–89 (1972). 
 272.  See, e.g., Hladio & Taylor, supra note 17, at 172–74; Hong, supra 
note 17, at 233; Casey, supra note 17, at 183–85. 
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criminal charges arising from the same conduct.273  This practice 
forces defendants to forgo a jury trial on the criminal charge 
because they face significant exposure to jail time from the 
probation violation that employs a lower burden of proof.  There is 
no need to retread this frequently plowed ground. 
This section will focus on a conundrum specific to Rhode 
Island: the meaning of the “reasonably satisfied” burden of proof.  
At a probation violation hearing, the burden of proof “is simply 
that of demonstrating that ‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence 
supports the finding that a defendant has violated probation.”274  
“The state is not required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that a defendant has committed a crime.  ‘The hearing justice can 
draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented to 
determine whether the defendant violated the terms of his 
probation.’”275  The hearing justice is also charged with 
determining the credibility of the witnesses.276 
Rhode Island courts have not been consistent in defining 
reasonably satisfied.  In State v. Rioux, the superior court 
expressed confusion over the meaning of reasonably satisfied, 
stating that it is “an extremely low standard that does not take 
much to satisfy . . . [and], I can be reasonably satisfied by a hot 
dog on occasion.”277  The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the 
probation revocation, notwithstanding the superior court’s 
comment about the hot dog, “[b]ecause the hearing justice 
correctly articulated the standard to be applied to probation-
violation determinations and because the record shows that in any 
event the preponderance of the evidence indicated that defendant 
had violated the terms of his probation, we are persuaded that the 
standard actually applied by the hearing justice in finding 
defendant to be a violator was the proper one.”278 
Rioux does not go into any detail about what “reasonably 
satisfied” means, but it does seem to say that the “reasonably 
 
 273.  See, e.g., The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences, supra note 
83, at 753–54. 
 274.  State v. Maloney, 956 A.2d 499, 504 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. 
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007)). 
 275.  State Seamans, 935 A.2d 618, 621–22 (R.I. 2007) (citations omitted) 
(quoting State v. Piette, 833 A.2d 1233, 1236 (R.I. 2003)). 
 276.  State v. Washington, 42 A.3d 1265, 1271 (R.I. 2012). 
 277.  State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998). 
 278.  Id. 
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satisfied” standard is itself satisfied when the evidence supports a 
finding by a preponderance of the evidence.  Three years earlier, 
in State v. Sparks,279 the Rhode Island Supreme Court pointed in 
a different direction.  In Sparks, a probation violation case, the 
court quoted the State as arguing that “the ‘reasonably satisfied’ 
standard of a probation-revocation hearing allows an even more 
relaxed burden of proof than the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard required in a civil case.”280  After the quote, and without 
further analysis, Sparks affirmed the superior court’s probation 
violation finding.281 
The meaning of Sparks is unclear, but it can be read to mean 
that “reasonably satisfied” is something less than a 
preponderance.  This view is further muddled by Massey v. 
Mullen, which explained that the standard of proof at a bail 
hearing is essentially the same as a probation violation 
hearing.282  Massey held that in bail hearings the prosecution 
“must meet a higher standard of proof [than probable cause].  
Specifically, the state must make out a case that demonstrates not 
only a factual probability of guilt but it must produce evidence 
that is legally sufficient to support a conviction.”283  This suggests 
that, analogizing to the probation violation context, the State 
must submit admissible evidence that, if believed, would satisfy 
the elements of the criminal charge and support a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Rhode Island Superior Court has also made opaque 
comments on the meaning of reasonably satisfied.  In State v. 
Reis, the superior court described reasonably satisfied as lower 
than probable cause (which itself is lower than a preponderance), 
reasoning that “[t]he same way the State does not need to prove a 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need not prove that 
there exists probable cause to determine a finding of violation.”284 
The sum of these decisions equals uncertainty on the 
 
 279.  667 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1995). 
 280.  Id. at 1252. 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Massey v. Mullen, 366 A.2d 1144, 1147 (R.I. 1976). 
 283.  Id. at 1148–49. 
 284.  No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 
2012); see also State v. Ford, No. P2-05-0083A, 2012 WL 3638916, at *6 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012). 
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quantum of proof necessary to prove a probation violation.  This is 
troubling because the stakes could not be higher: defendants at 
violation hearings are often facing many years in prison from a 
previously-imposed suspended sentence.  If probable cause (or 
less) is all that is needed to prove a probation violation, and a 
neutral decision-maker determines that probable cause exists to 
bring a new criminal charge based on the same conduct, then it is 
game over for any probationer also facing a new criminal charge.  
This is because the probable cause finding for the new crime 
would be sufficient to find that the defendant violated probation. 
Rhode Island is not alone in the lack of a clear definition for 
“reasonably satisfied.”  For probation violators in the federal 
system (recall that probation is relatively rare and for defendants 
who do not receive jail time at the original sentencing), the 
probation statute does not enumerate a burden of proof.285  To fill 
the void, the First Circuit employs a “reasonably-satisfied” 
standard286—the same as the Rhode Island burden of proof.  But, 
just like Rhode Island, the First Circuit has not defined what it 
means.  In the last First Circuit case to discuss it, United States v. 
Vixamar, the First Circuit declined to define the meaning of 
reasonable satisfaction for probation violations, hypothesizing 
that it could mean preponderance of the evidence or maybe 
something less.287  Vixamar explained it did not define the term 
because the evidence in that case surpassed the preponderance 
standard and there was no need to take up the issue.288 
Unlike probation violations, the burden of proof for a 
supervised release violation in the federal system is explicitly 
defined by statute: the government must prove its case by a 
preponderance of the evidence.289  This is significant because 
Rhode Island’s probation system is often more similar to federal 
supervised release than federal probation.  Many Rhode Island 
sentences include a period of incarceration, which in the federal 
system would result in a term of supervised release rather than 
 
 285.  United States v. Vixamar, 679 F.3d 22, 26 n.4 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The 
probation-revocation statute . . . says nothing about the level of evidence 
required.”). 
 286.  Id. at 29. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Id. 
 289.  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). 
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probation. 
Returning to first principles, Morrissey makes clear that the 
burden of proof for a probation violation should be more than 
probable cause but is otherwise silent on an appropriate burden of 
proof.  At the final revocation for a parole violation, Morrissey 
holds that the “hearing must be the basis for more than 
determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of 
any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the 
facts as determined warrant revocation.”290  The Rhode Island 
Attorney General’s 1996 advisory opinion to the State Parole 
Board echoes and expands on this approach. The advisory opinion 
states that “the standard of proof applicable to parole revocation 
hearings is a preponderance of the evidence.”291  Given the 
similarity between parole and probation revocation as framed by 
Morrissey and Gagnon, and taking into account the Attorney 
General’s advisory opinion, clarifying that preponderance of the 
evidence is the burden of proof required for “reasonable 
satisfaction” would remove uncertainty about the quantum of 
evidence required to prove a probation violation in Rhode 
Island.292 
VI. SENTENCING ON THE VIOLATION 
The last stage in the probation violation process is the 
sentencing on the violation.  Rhode Island’s sentencing practices 
for violations raise concerns both procedurally and substantively.  
Section 12-19-9 of Rhode Island’s General Laws dictates that after 
a finding of a probation violation, “in open court and in the 
presence of the defendant, [the superior court] may remove the 
suspension and order the defendant committed on the sentence 
 
 290.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972). 
 291.  Office of the Att’y Gen. of R.I., Unofficial Op. U96-05, 1996 WL 
33164516, at *2 (Aug. 15, 1996). 
 292.  Two days before the final draft of this Article went to press, the 
Presiding Justice of the Rhode Island Superior Court issued proposed 
amendments to the probation system.  See Order Soliciting Comments on 
Proposed Amendments, supra note 70.  As relevant here, the proposal would 
amend Rule 32(f) of Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to read: “No revocation shall occur unless the State establishes by 
a fair preponderance of the evidence that the defendant breached a condition 
of his/her probation or deferred sentence or failed to keep the peace or remain 
on good behavior.”  See id. at 1. 
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previously imposed, or on a lesser sentence, or impose a sentence 
if one has not been previously imposed, or may continue the 
suspension of a sentence previously imposed, as to the court may 
seem just and proper.”293  The Rhode Island Supreme Court has 
interpreted this provision to provide the lower courts with “wide 
latitude” at sentencing on a probation violation.294 
From a procedural perspective, under Rhode Island law courts 
have held there is no basis for delay or even allocution at the end 
of a probation revocation hearing before sentencing.  Once a 
defendant is found in violation of probation, no statute or 
procedural rule “requires allocution or argument before a 
suspension of sentence is lifted and the sentence is ordered to be 
served.”295  Essentially, there is no right to a presentence report 
or any form of mitigation argument.296  The defendant is 
subjected to long periods of incarceration from a suspended 
sentence without any absolute right to advise the court of the 
defendant’s individual characteristics. 
The rules are substantially different in federal court, where 
the defendant has a right of allocution and the ability to present 
evidence in mitigation at sentencing on supervised release and 
probation revocation.297  The violation and sentencing hearing is 
regularly referred to a federal magistrate judge for proposed 
findings of fact and a recommended disposition, which gives the 
defendant the ability to object and make focused arguments to the 
district judge who reviews de novo the magistrate judge’s report 
and recommendation.298  In the federal system, the district judge 
at the final revocation and sentencing hearing is also the same 
judge that sentenced the defendant on the underlying crime.  This 
leads to continuity and familiarity with the defendant and the 
case when making a sentencing decision on a violation.  By 
contrast, in the state system, the judge at the probation hearing is 
the judge that happens to be sitting on the calendar that day, and 
is infrequently the same judge that presided over the original 
 
 293.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006).  The rule for state district court is 
the same.  See id. § 12-19-14. 
 294.  State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 454 (R.I. 2000). 
 295.  State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1069 (R.I. 2001); see also State v. 
Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 682 (R.I. 2009). 
 296.  See Nania, 786 A.2d at 1069 n.1. 
 297.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b)(2)(E). 
 298.  See R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32.1. 
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sentencing on the underlying crime.  This means there is a good 
chance the judge will have very little information about the 
defendant’s individual characteristics that might impact the 
sentencing decision. 
Turning to substantive issues, the sheer length of the 
sentence imposed for a probation violation raises concerns.  Recall 
from earlier in this Article that the original sentence on the 
underlying crime often maxes out most if not all the recommended 
prison term enumerated in Rhode Island’s sentencing 
benchmarks, and the original sentence usually includes a 
suspended sentence that is much longer than the prison-time 
portion of the sentence. 
Because the defendant remains on probation for long periods 
of time, typically after a shorter term of incarceration, the maxing 
out of the sentencing benchmarks at the original sentencing 
becomes a problem when a sentencing court must craft an 
appropriate sentence for a probation violation.  While admittedly 
advisory, Rhode Island’s sentencing benchmarks are applicable to 
sentencings for probation violations: 
The benchmark sentencing ranges are also presumed to 
be appropriate in cases where the sentence has been 
suspended or deferred and where the defendant has been 
declared a violator of the conditions of his or her 
probation.  In those situations, the sentencing judge 
should refer to the benchmark which is applicable to the 
original offense.  Departures from the ranges should be 
made only when substantial and compelling 
circumstances exist.  As in other instances, if the 
sentence is outside the benchmark range, the judge must 
give specific reasons for the departure on the record.299 
This benchmark is not a model of clarity, but its most natural 
reading is that if a sentencing court has already imposed a jail 
term consistent with the benchmarks, it should not impose 
 
 299.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶ 6, at 689–90.  In 
contrast to the sentencing benchmarks, the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines have detailed policy statements to guide sentencing on revocation 
of probation or supervised release and a revocation table with ranges of 
imprisonment.  See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7 
(U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2015). 
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additional jail time for a probation violation unless “substantial 
and compelling circumstances exist.”  This clearly is not the 
practice in Rhode Island, where probation violators make up an 
estimated 61% of the prison population at the ACI.300  Another 
more unnatural reading of the benchmarks, which may be closer 
to explaining the reality of sentencing in Rhode Island, is to use 
the original sentencing benchmark as the guideline for 
punishment for the probation violation.  In other words, if a 
defendant is convicted of larceny from a person, the sentencing 
benchmark is 2.5 to 3.5 years.301  If the defendant violates 
probation after release from prison for any reason, the unnatural 
reading of the sentencing benchmarks would guide the court to 
incarcerate the defendant for another 2.5 to 3.5 years, which is the 
original sentencing benchmark for the underlying crime. 
In cases where the sentencing court has already imposed a 
jail term consistent with the benchmarks,302 the original sentence 
usually includes a suspended sentence.  In this scenario, applying 
the most natural reading of the sentencing benchmarks for 
probation violations, the sentencing court is in effect imposing an 
above-benchmark sentence when a suspended sentence is revoked 
and the defendant is re-incarcerated.  In these cases, the 
proceeding has lost its legal moorings from the “act of grace” that 
justifies the minimal due process and reduced burden of proof for 
a probation violation.  The defendant has already served the time 
in prison intended for the original crime, but the long suspended 
sentence subjects the defendant to another long prison term or to 
a series of shorter stints of incarceration.303 
 
 300.  JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP, supra note 48, at 13.  
 301.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS 16, at 694. 
 302.  See MACFADYEN & HURST, supra note 65, § 32.2, at 302–03 (“[A]s a 
practical matter, the benchmarks have become a minimum range for 
sentences after trial for the enumerated crimes; and it is more usual to see 
sentences persistently in excess of the benchmark than it is to see them 
significantly lower than those recommended.” (emphasis added)).   
 303.  Two days before the final draft of this Article went to press, the 
Presiding Justice of the Rhode Island Superior Court issued proposed 
amendments to the probation system.  See supra note 70.  As relevant here, 
the proposal would amend the sentencing benchmarks to provide examples of 
substantial and compelling circumstances that would justify departure from 
the benchmarks in probation violation proceedings, including whether the 
violation is technical in nature or constitutes or crime, and the defendant’s 
record and length of compliance while on probation. 
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court has said that sentencing on 
a probation violation is not punishment for a new crime. The 
probation violation system operates under the legal fiction that a 
defendant is violated for breaching probation conditions, not for 
committing a crime, even when a defendant is violated for conduct 
that is also the basis for the underlying crime.304  This reasoning 
is difficult to square with the sentencing court’s ability to consider 
the “totality of the circumstances” at sentencing on a violation, 
which the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held can include the 
probation violation conduct, which may in turn constitute the 
circumstances of the new crime.305  It is hard to fathom that a 
long prison sentence based on a probation violation is not 
punishment for a new crime based on the same conduct, when the 
defendant has already been incarcerated for the old crime and the 
revocation of the suspended sentence from the old crime is much 
higher than what the defendant would receive if sentenced for the 
new crime. 
To be fair, the issue of punishment for a probation violation 
and a new crime based on the same conduct gets complicated 
when the alleged probation violation goes to the core of the “act of 
grace” by which the court imposed less prison time than it could 
have at the original sentencing on the underlying crime.  To 
return to Pitts, the case of the masturbator in the van near the 
school, the defendant had already served seven years in prison, a 
below-benchmarks sentence for first-degree child molestation.306  
Ostensibly, the reduced sentence could be viewed as an act of 
grace.  Later, after the defendant was released from prison and 
violated probation, the court sentenced the defendant to another 
five years of incarceration.307  The underlying conduct that formed 
the basis for the probation violation constituted (at most) the 
crime of disorderly conduct, a petty misdemeanor.  If the 
defendant had not been on probation, he would have been subject 
to a maximum of six months in jail,308 not the five years he 
 
 304.  See State v. Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007). 
 305.  See State v. Wisehart, 569 A.2d 434, 437 (R.I. 1990). 
 306.  State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242 (R.I. 2008); cf. R.I. R. SUPER. CT. 
SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶¶ 35–36 (calling for ranges from ten years to life 
in prison depending on the circumstances). 
 307.  Pitts, 960 A.2d at 242. 
 308.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1(c) (2006). 
BALDWIN & THOMPSON FINAL EDIT WORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2016  11:37 PM 
306 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 21:244 
received from his suspended sentence.  To make matters more 
complicated, after the probation violation hearing, the Pitts 
defendant was later found guilty in a separate criminal proceeding 
on one count of disorderly conduct based on the same set of facts 
as the probation violation.  He was sentenced to six months 
imprisonment for the new crime to be served consecutively to the 
five-year prison term from the probation violation proceeding.309 
In Judge Torruella’s words, this is the “tail wagging the dog”: 
the Pitts defendant received a much longer sentence at the 
probation violation hearing than at the companion criminal 
proceeding.310  Nevertheless, the combined term of incarceration 
that the Pitts defendant received for his original crime of 
conviction for first and second degree child molestation—the seven 
years at the initial sentencing followed by five more years for the 
probation violation, for a total of twelve years in prison—is 
consistent with the sentencing benchmarks for first-degree child 
molestation.311  In essence, the Pitts defendant’s new criminal 
conduct was used to punish him harshly for breaching the court’s 
“act of grace” at the original sentencing on the old crime, even 
though a harsh punishment was not available for the new crime 
standing alone. 
The Pitts approach is similar to the underlying policies for 
sentencing on supervised release and probation violations in the 
federal system, although the five-year sentence the Pitts 
defendant received on the violation is much longer than the 
federal guidelines range.  As chapter 7 of the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines Manual makes clear, the 
Commission debated two approaches to sanctioning supervised 
release and probation violations: either a “breach of trust” model, 
or treating the violation as if the revocation is used for sentencing 
a new crime.312  The Commission decided to go with the “breach of 
trust” approach, under which “the sentence imposed upon 
revocation would be intended to sanction the violator for failing to 
abide by the conditions of the court-ordered supervision, leaving 
the punishment for any new criminal conduct to the court 
 
 309.  Pitts, 990 A.2d at 188. 
 310.  See United States v. St. Hill, 768 F.3d 33, 40 (1st Cir. 2014). 
 311.  R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING BENCHMARKS ¶¶ 35–36. 
 312.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A(3)(b) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
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responsible for imposing the sentence for that offense.”313  Among 
other reasons, the Commission explained that treating the 
revocation as a sentencing for new criminal conduct would 
essentially duplicate the actual sentence in the separate 
proceeding on the new criminal charge.314 
Because the federal system treats a supervised release or 
probation violation as a breach of trust, the federal sentencing 
guidelines315 for length of incarceration on a violation are 
relatively short compared to the length of a sentence if the conduct 
was viewed as a new criminal charge.  In the Pitts example, if the 
defendant was in the federal system, his disorderly conduct charge 
would probably be categorized as a Grade C violation of 
supervised release or probation.316  The maximum recommended 
range of imprisonment for a Grade C violation is eight to fourteen 
months, although the guidelines suggest an upward departure 
may be warranted when the violation conduct is “associated with a 
high risk of new felonious conduct (e.g., a defendant, under 
supervision for conviction of criminal sexual abuse, violates the 
condition that the defendant not associate with children by 
loitering near a schoolyard).”317  The Pitts defendant could qualify 
for an upward departure because his original crime consisted of 
child molestation and his probation violation consisted of 
masturbating near a school, which could be seen as high risk for 
new criminal conduct related to his original crime.  Nevertheless, 
it is significant that the Pitts defendant’s sentence of five years in 
prison in the state system is roughly five times greater than the 
guidelines range for a supervised release or probation violation in 
the federal system. 
Pitts is a good example of a complicated case involving 
parallel punishment for an old crime and a new crime in the 
probation violation context.  Pitts shows that sometimes there are 
no easy answers—on the one hand, the Pitts defendant received 
 
 313.  Id.  
 314.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.1(A)(3) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
 315.  Technically, the sentencing recommendations in the federal system 
for supervised release and probation violations are “policy statements” and 
not guidelines, but usually they are colloquially referred to as sentencing 
guidelines.  See id. § 7A(3)(a). 
 316.  Id. § 7A(3)(b). 
 317.  See id. § 7B1.4 cmt. 3 (emphasis omitted). 
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an act of grace at his initial sentencing and the remainder of his 
benchmarks sentence after he violated; but on the other hand, the 
new criminal conduct subjected him only to six months in prison 
as a standalone crime, and yet he received a prison term ten times 
longer on his violation sentence. 
At bottom, the conundrum of enhanced sentencing for state 
probation violations echoes the dilemma highlighted by Judge 
Torruella and brings into stark relief the federal Sentencing 
Commission’s decision to treat violations as a breach of trust 
rather than as a vehicle to punish defendants for new crimes.  
Post-Booker, federal sentencing courts have wide discretion to 
impose sentences up to the statutory maximum and often justify 
lengthier terms by relying on “relevant conduct” allegations not 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is similar to the situation 
in Rhode Island, where the sentencing benchmarks are not 
mandatory and courts have ample latitude to impose part or all of 
a suspended sentence based on a probation violation that is 
proven with a low burden of proof.  If probation violations were 
viewed primarily as a breach of the original sentencing court’s 
trust, sometimes the result will be a long sentence like in Pitts, 
but in most instances the sentence on the probation violation 
would be relatively short.  Under current sentencing practices in 
Rhode Island, however, defendants receive probation violation 
prison terms that are often more commensurate with punishment 
for new criminal conduct, without a laser-like focus on the breach 
of the court’s trust from the sentencing on the original crime.  
Long suspended sentences coupled with equally long periods of 
probation provide the state courts with the ability to sentence 
probation violators to long prison sentences irrespective of the 
relationship between the probation violation and the breach of the 
court’s trust.  When this reality is combined with the low burden 
of proof for probation violations, the result is long jail terms, or a 
series of shorter jail terms for serial violators, which has triggered 
a cycle of mass incarceration in Rhode Island. 
VII.  CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS ON PROBATION VIOLATION 
HEARINGS 
In Rhode Island, probationers face an uphill battle from the 
very beginning at the original sentencing for the underlying crime 
all the way through to the very end at the sentencing on the 
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probation violation.  The sum of these individual roadblocks is 
thousands of Swords of Damocles that hang over the thousands of 
Rhode Islanders who are currently on probation.  The Sword 
hangs over these defendants’ heads by a single horse-hair, often 
for many years. 
This Article has endeavored to identify concerns with Rhode 
Island’s probation violation system and compare state practices to 
the federal system.  Each system has issues.  As Judge Torruella’s 
concurrence in St. Hill shows, many of the concerns about Rhode 
Island’s probation system are present in the federal system. 
Much ink has been spilled elsewhere on the coercive nature of 
probation hearings when the probation violation is coupled with a 
new criminal charge based on the same conduct.318  Because of the 
dearth of procedural and substantive rights that attach in 
probation violation proceedings, the defendant will frequently 
plead to the new criminal charge and the probation violation to 
avoid jail time or receive a lesser sentence.  Defendants often 
forfeit the constitutional right to a jury trial on the new criminal 
charge and forfeit their limited due process rights.  There is no 
constitutional right to a jury trial at a probation violation 
hearing.319 
Prosecutors need leeway to charge crimes when probable 
cause exists.  In the plea context, courts regularly hold that a plea 
bargain is not unconstitutionally coercive merely because a 
prosecutor threatens a greater sentence if a defendant reneges or 
rejects a plea offer.320  As long as the prosecutor has a legitimate 
basis to bring a new criminal charge based on the same conduct as 
the probation violation charge, the prosecutor’s actions will not be 
considered unconstitutionally coercive in forcing a plea or a waiver 
of a jury trial.321 
 
 318.  See, e.g., Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire & Angela Yingling, No 
Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode Island, 21 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 316 
(2016); Peter F. Skwirz, Not to be Countenanced: Pre-Bail Revocation Hearing 
Detention In Rhode Island District Court, R.I. B.J. May/June 2014, at 7, 7; 
The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences, supra note 83, at 765. 
 319.  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); United States v. 
Czajak, 909 F.2d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 320.  See United States v. Jenkins, 537 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2008); see also 
Powell v. Chandler, No. 13-C-75, 2014 WL 2198475, at *6 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 
2014), aff’d sub nom. Powell v. Enloe, 598 F. App’x 451, 453 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 321.  See, e.g., United States v. Steele, No. 10-20037-01-JWL, 2015 WL 
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Nevertheless, the current state of the Rhode Island probation 
system is problematic because probation defendants held in 
custody have no means to challenge a violation charge at a 
preliminary hearing.  Equally problematic, it is not clear whether 
a prosecutor must have probable cause to make a charging 
decision on a probation violation, or even needs probable cause to 
prove a probation violation.322 
Prosecutorial discretion reaches its practical limit when it 
forces a plea on a crime for which no probable cause exists.  When 
probable cause does not exist, a prosecutor’s “broad discretion to 
initiate and conduct criminal proceedings” ends.323  “A 
prosecutor’s broad discretion to charge has only two limitations: 
(1) selective enforcement of the law based on the race or religion of 
the defendant, and (2) threats of charges which the prosecutor has 
no probable cause to believe are warranted.”324  Under current 
Rhode Island law, as demonstrated by this Article, the lack of 
probable cause is a realistic possibility even when a probation 
violation is brought in good faith.  This raises troubling questions 
about the coercive power of bringing a probation violation charge 
both when bundling a probation violation with a new criminal 
charge and when bringing a stand-alone probation violation.  It 
also raises knotty issues on malicious prosecution.  Such claims 
are typically actionable when a prosecution lacks probable cause 
and the criminal charge is dismissed, and are usually disposed of 
quickly because probable cause exists as a matter of law.325  If 
probable cause is not required to bring a probation violation 
charge, a key question in malicious prosecution cases will become 
whether the defendant can show clear proof of malice—a fact-
 
1530554, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 6, 2015), appeal dismissed, 616 Fed. App’x 395 
(10th Cir. 2015). 
 322.  State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *27 (R.I. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (“The same way the State does not need to prove a 
violation beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need not prove that there 
exists probable cause to determine a finding of violation.”). 
 323.  See United States v. Rodella, 59 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1350 (D.N.M. 
2014). 
 324.  United States v. Shamsian, 933 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(unpublished table decision). 
 325.  Hill v. R.I. State Emps.’ Ret. Bd., 935 A.2d 608, 613 (R.I. 2007) 
(“Whether defendants in a malicious-prosecution action had probable cause to 
initiate a criminal action is a question of law to be determined by the court.”). 
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based inquiry not designed for quick resolution.326 
One way to recalibrate the scales is to add a few more 
horsehairs to the Sword of Damocles.  The State could be required 
to show probable cause to charge a probation violation at a 
preliminary hearing.  Equally important, alleged probation 
violators could be considered more closely for bail.  Under the 
current system, alleged probation violators face inordinate 
pressure to plead to new crimes because they are immediately 
locked up pending the violation hearing.  If the defendant was 
released on bail, this would lessen the pressure for a probation 
violation to proceed quickly and make it easier for the criminal 
charges to be resolved first. 
In the federal system, when a probation or supervised release 
violation is based on new criminal conduct, the general practice is 
for the new criminal charges to be resolved before the revocation 
hearing.327  The Rhode Island Supreme Court could exercise in 
inherent authority to mandate a similar system.  It has done so 
before.  In DeLomba, the court exercised its administrative 
authority to require derivate use immunity for testimony at a 
probation violation hearing that precedes a criminal trial based on 
the same allegations.328  Taking this a step further to require the 
 
 326.  See Horton v. Portsmouth Police Dep’t, 22 A.3d 1115, 1121 (R.I. 
2011). 
 327.  A comparison between the state and federal system is not entirely 
apples-to-apples.  In the state system, the bundling of the probation violation 
and new criminal charges both involve conduct governed by state law.  In the 
federal system, supervised release violations are often based on pending 
state-law charges.  In those cases, the federal supervised release violation 
proceeding is often continued until the state-law charges are resolved in state 
court.  Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the prison sentence 
arising from the federal supervised release violation is to be served 
consecutively after the completion of the state court sentence for the new 
criminal charge.  See United States v. Reeks, 441 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127 (D. 
Me. 2006) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7B1.3(f) (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2015)).  There are also federal cases in which the 
government decides to bring a new federal criminal charge and the defendant 
is subjected to a supervised release proceeding based on the same conduct.  
When this happens, the federal sentence on the new criminal charge is 
usually much longer than the federal sentence for the violation, so the 
potential for prison time from the violation proceeding is generally less 
important to the defendant in the federal system than the state system. 
 328.  State v. DeLomba, 370 A.2d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 1977).  For an 
interesting survey of case law on testimonial immunity when probation 
hearings precede criminal trials on the same conduct, see State v. Flood, 986 
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criminal trial before the probation violation hearing would 
eliminate many of the due process concerns that come with 
probation violation hearings, including the low burden of proof, 
limited right of cross-examination, lack of discovery, and non-
existence of the jury trial. This is not a novel concept and has been 
suggested or discussed by many in the legal field, including the 
American Bar Association.329 
Under existing Rhode Island law, requiring the criminal trial 
first would force the State to bring new charges only if it believes 
it can prove them beyond a reasonable doubt.  Although it sounds 
radical, this is not much different from the intent of the General 
Assembly.  Section 12-19-18 requires that a person in prison from 
a suspended sentence after a probation violation hearing must be 
released when the subsequent criminal trial for the same criminal 
conduct results in a not guilty finding or dismissal.330  The Rhode 
Island Superior Court has held that section 12-19-18 is 
unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers,331 and 
the issue is currently on appeal before the Supreme Court.332  In 
any event, the teaching of section 12-19-18 illuminates a path 
forward.  If the criminal trial occurred before the probation 
violation hearing, the State would have to decide if it could prove 
the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.  If not, the State would 
be left solely to charging a probation violation and the defendant 
would not face the crucible of admitting to a probation violation 
and new criminal charges, a decision that results in serious 
collateral consequences.333 
Relatedly, sentencing practices both at the original sentencing 
on the underlying crime and at the probation revocation hearing 
should be reconsidered.  For the original sentencing, courts should 
 
A.2d 626 (N.H. 2009).  
 329.  See, e.g., The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences, supra note 
83, at 785 (discussing section 18-7.4(h) of the American Bar Association 
Standards for Criminal Justice Sentencing); Klein, supra note 198, at 2, 5. 
 330.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-18 (2006). 
 331.  See, e.g., State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *14 
(R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012). 
 332.  State v. Beaudoin, No. SU-13-0254 (R.I. full arguments heard Jan. 
20, 2016). 
 333.  For example, a criminal defendant with two convictions generally 
cannot have either crime expunged from his record.  See State v. Badessa, 
869 A.2d 61, 64–65 (R.I. 2005) (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-1(3)).  This can 
be a serious impediment to employment. 
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consider de-coupling the term of probation from the length of the 
suspended sentence.  In most cases, there is no good reason for a 
defendant to spend a significant portion of his or her adult life on 
probation.  Similarly, suspended sentences imposed at the original 
sentencing should be shorter; this would exhibit fidelity to the “act 
of grace” theory of sentencing, justify the reduced due process on 
the violation, and move the practical application of the probation 
violation system back towards the proposition that a violator is 
being sentenced for the old crime and not the new crime. 
At the probation hearing, even if the violation allegation is 
based on a new crime, the prison sentence on the violation should 
be guided by the measure of grace the defendant received at the 
initial sentencing, and how the probation violation reflects an 
abuse of that grace.  This essentially is the approach taken by the 
United States Sentencing Commission in chapter 7 of its 
Guidelines Manual.334  Applying this approach in Rhode Island 
courts would re-tether the violation sentencing to the limited due 
process afforded at violation hearings because the defendant 
would not be subject to punishment for the new crime, and it 
would clarify that the violation sentence is for the violation of 
probation, while the sentence for the new crime is to be imposed in 
the new case.  As a practical matter, if there is no prison time left 
under Rhode Island’s sentencing benchmarks from the original 
term of incarceration, the court should have a compelling reason 
to impose more jail time on a probation violation, and should 
consider more creative sentencing options than incarceration.  It is 
troubling when an allegation proven at a probation violation 
hearing, which is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, results in 
double the amount of jail time compared to the conduct that 
formed the basis for the crime in the first place.335 
In sum, by adding a few more horse-hairs to the Sword of 
Damocles, the Rhode Island probation system can still protect the 
public, while at the same time preserve the rights of criminal 
defendants and reduce mass incarceration. 
 
 334.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 7A(3)(B) (U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N 2015). 
 335.  See, e.g., State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 326 (R.I. 2008) 
(sentencing defendant to three years in prison at original sentencing; 
received six years in prison for technical probation violation for failing to 
remain current with sex-offender counseling). 
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CODA 
As the authors have noted in several footnotes throughout 
this Article, on March 16, 2016, two days before the final draft 
went to press, the Presiding Justice of the Rhode Island Superior 
Court submitted to the Rhode Island Supreme Court proposed 
amendments to the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks that directly 
relate to the probation violation system.336  At press time, the 
proposed amendments were in a public comment period scheduled 
to end on April 12, 2016.337 
The proposal consists of five major amendments to the 
current system.  First, the burden of proof for a probation 
revocation would be clarified to require “a fair preponderance of 
the evidence.”338  Next, the rules would be amended to allow for 
termination of an existing probationary sentence after three years 
of good behavior.339  Third, the proposal would amend the 
sentencing benchmarks to de-couple the length of the 
probationary period from the length of the suspended sentence, 
and to stress that probation conditions should advance the 
purposes of probation and not impose a greater burden than 
necessary to achieve that purpose.340  Fourth, a new subsection of 
the sentencing benchmarks would provide additional examples of 
substantial and compelling circumstances that might justify 
upward sentencing departures for probation violators.341  Finally, 
the proposal adds a new sentencing benchmark that states a term 
of probation should not exceed three years for felony offenses, 
although most state felonies are specifically excluded from this 
limitation.342 
The fate of the proposed amendments remains unclear at 
press time, but they are generally consistent with the theme of 
adding a few more horse-hairs to the Sword of Damocles.  The 
authors observe, however, that the proposal does not eliminate the 
 
 336.  See generally Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, 
supra note 70. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  Id. at 1. 
 339.  Id. at 1–2. 
 340.  Id. at 3. 
 341.  Id. at 3–4. 
 342.  Id. at 4. 
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implied probation conditions of keeping the peace and remaining 
on good behavior, or otherwise clarify what these terms mean. 
 
